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PATENT SCOPE AND ENABLEMENT IN 
RAPIDLY DEVELOPING ARTS* 
ALAN L. DURHAM** 
The claims of a patent and its enabling disclosure must be 
commensurate in scope. However, because of the open-ended 
nature of most patent claims, in fields of rapidly developing 
technology it is almost inevitable that, before the patent has 
expired, the claims will read on embodiments that the 
specification does not teach. The current law on scope 
enablement is the source of much confusion. Because enablement 
must be judged from a filing-date perspective, some cases dismiss 
later advancements (e.g., a newly discovered species within a 
claimed genus) as irrelevant. Other cases, in contrast, hold patent 
claims invalid because they exceed the scope of what could have 
been achieved when the application was filed. A clear and 
balanced rule of scope enablement is essential to a patent system 
designed to “promote the Progress of	.	.	.	useful Arts.” Claims 
that exceed the scope of the patent’s teachings can stand in the 
way of technological progress; at the same time, claims to 
important advancements—the advancements most susceptible to 
elaboration and improvement—should not be so severely limited 
in scope that they are all but worthless. In this Article, I propose 
an analytical framework designed to reconcile some of the 
apparent contradictions and to reward patentees in a manner that 
promotes technological advancement in rapidly developing 
fields. I propose that courts address patent claims that include 
nonenabled embodiments from the perspective of a reasonable 
applicant. The claims should not be held invalid (1) if the 
nonenabled embodiments were unforeseeable; (2) if the 
nonenabled embodiments are “tangential” (i.e., the nonenabled 
aspects of those embodiments are unrelated to the patentee’s 
contribution to the art); or (3) if for some other reason a 
reasonable applicant could not have been expected to draft 
claims that would have excluded the nonenabled embodiments. 
The model for this three-part test is the Supreme Court’s rule on 
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prosecution history estoppel, as outlined in Festo. Although 
enablement and prosecution history estoppel are very different 
areas of patent law, in both instances respect for the limitations of 
a reasonable applicant leads to outcomes consistent with sound 
patent policy. 
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INTRODUCTION 
One of the fundamental requirements of a valid patent is a 
disclosure that teaches persons skilled in the art how to make and use 
the invention without undue experimentation.1 Because the rights of 
the patentee extend to all devices, methods, or compositions of 
matter that have the elements set forth in the patent claims—e.g., all 
mousetraps that combine features A, B, and C—courts also require 
that the teachings of the patent be commensurate in scope.2 If some 
embodiments covered by the claims cannot be made or used without 
undue experimentation, the disclosure may be nonenabling.3 The 
problem is that open-ended patent claims almost inevitably include 
some embodiments that cannot be made or used without 
technological advancements unknown when the patent application 
was filed and unachievable without extensive experimentation. If 
courts allow only narrow claims that exclude such embodiments, they 
risk limiting patent rights in rapidly developing fields so much that the 
incentive to secure a patent—an incentive necessary, in the 
constitutional phrase, to “promote the Progress of	.	.	.	[the] useful 
Arts”—is severely diminished.4 On the other hand, progress in the 
useful arts is also dependent on subsequent innovations, which will be 
hindered if the rights of patentees extend far beyond their 
contributions to the field. These competing considerations demand an 
approach to enablement that considers both sides of the equation. 
The current state of the law relating to scope enablement is 
frustratingly obscure. Some courts say that the disclosure of even one 
mode of making and using the invention is enough to satisfy the 
enablement requirement.5 Others suggest that every embodiment 
 
 1. See, e.g., MagSil Corp. v. Hitachi Glob. Storage Techs. Inc., 687 F.3d 1377, 1380–
81 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“To be enabling, the specification of a patent must teach those skilled 
in the art how to make and use the full scope of the claimed invention without ‘undue 
experimentation.’	” (quoting Genentech, Inc. v. Novo Nordisk, A/S, 108 F.3d 1361, 1365 
(Fed. Cir. 1997))). 
 2. See, e.g., id. at 1381 (“The scope of the claims must be less than or equal to the 
scope of the enablement	.	.	.	.” (quoting Sitrick v. Dreamworks, LLC, 516 F.3d 993, 999 
(Fed. Cir. 2008))). 
 3. See, e.g., id. (“Thus, a patentee chooses broad claim language at the peril of losing 
any claim that cannot be enabled across its full scope of coverage.”). 
 4. U.S. CONST. art. I, §	8, cl. 8. 
 5. See, e.g., Takeda Pharm. Co. v. Zydus Pharm. USA, Inc., 743 F.3d 1359, 1369 
(Fed. Cir. 2014) (“It is well established that the ‘enablement requirement is met if the 
description enables any mode of making and using the invention.’	” (quoting Johns 
Hopkins Univ. v. CellPro, Inc., 152 F.3d 1342, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1998))). 
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within the scope of the claim must be enabled.6 Some cases warn that 
developments subsequent to the filing date of the patent are 
irrelevant.7 Others rely on such developments to demonstrate that the 
claims are too broad.8 In this Article, I propose a framework for 
addressing scope enablement designed to reconcile some of these 
apparent contradictions and to reward patentees in a manner that 
promotes technological advancement in rapidly developing fields. 
This framework, in essence, requires that a patent disclosure teach 
persons skilled in the relevant art how to make and use all 
embodiments within the scope of the claims, except in cases where 
the nonenabled embodiments could not reasonably have been 
avoided by the prosecution of narrower claims. The exception would 
apply (1) if the nonenabled embodiments were unforeseeable when 
the claims were prosecuted; (2) if the aspects of the nonenabled 
embodiments that render them nonenabled are tangential to the 
patentee’s contribution to the art (i.e., they are additions to, rather 
than substitutions for, the patentee’s invention); or (3) if the lack of a 
suitable vocabulary, or some other reason, made it impossible for the 
patentee to supply a more narrowly tailored claim. 
Part I provides a brief summary of the basic enablement 
requirement, which demands that a patent include enough 
information to allow persons skilled in the art to practice the 
invention without undue experimentation. Part II deals with matters 
of scope. Section II.A discusses claims that are not enabled because 
they include distinct alternatives to the embodiments taught in the 
specification or a range of embodiments inadequately represented by 
the disclosed species. Section II.B examines instances where, in 
contrast, a single mode of practicing the claimed invention was said to 
suffice. Section II.C addresses scope enablement within the context of 
rapidly developing technologies, where the law has seemed 
inconsistent; some cases consider post-filing-date advancements to be 
irrelevant, while others use such advancements to demonstrate the 
shortcomings of the patent disclosure. Part III proposes a framework 
for examining issues of scope enablement where rapid technological 
advancements lead to nonenabled embodiments within the scope of 
the claims. Section III.A discusses unforeseeable embodiments, 
 
 6. See MagSil, 687 F.3d at 1381 (“The scope of the claims must be less than or equal 
to the scope of the enablement	.	.	.	.” (quoting Sitrick v. Dreamworks, LLC, 516 F.3d 993, 
999 (Fed. Cir. 2008))). 
 7. See Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 363 F.3d 1247, 1254 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[N]ew 
technology [is] by definition, outside the bounds of the enablement requirement.”). 
 8. See MagSil, 687 F.3d at 1382. 
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Section III.B “tangential” embodiments, and Section III.C other 
embodiments that could not reasonably have been excluded by the 
patent claims. Section III.D considers a role for the reverse doctrine 
of equivalents in cases where over-broad claims could not reasonably 
have been avoided. 
I.  BASIC ENABLEMENT 
The object of the United States patent system, as expressed in 
Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution, is to “promote the Progress 
of	.	.	.	[the] useful Arts.”9 Inventors who achieve technological 
advancements unattainable by those of “ordinary skill in the art”10 are 
eligible to receive, through a patent, the exclusive right to make, use, 
or sell the invention.11 By promising inventors appropriate financial 
rewards, the patent system encourages investments in technological 
progress that benefit society as a whole.12 In addition, a patent 
applicant must provide a detailed disclosure of the invention.13 When 
that disclosure is published as a part of the patent specification, the 
information it contains enriches the knowledge available to the 
public. A “full, clear, enabling description of the invention” has been 
called the “sine qua non of a valid patent.”14 
The enablement requirement demands that the patent 
specification teach persons of ordinary skill in the art how to make 
and use the claimed invention without “undue experimentation.”15 
Although the distinction is not commonly discussed, enablement may 
be broken down into two requirements: “how to make” and “how to 
 
 9. U.S. CONST. art. I, §	8, cl. 8. 
 10. Minor advancements that would have been obvious to persons of ordinary skill in 
the art are barred from patenting under §	103 of the Patent Act. See 35 U.S.C. §	103 (2012) 
(“A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained	.	.	.	if the differences between the 
claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would 
have been obvious	.	.	.	to a person having ordinary skill in the art	.	.	.	.”); Ritchie v. Vast 
Res., Inc., 563 F.3d 1334, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (obvious advancements include “those 
modest, routine, everyday, incremental improvements of an existing product or process 
that	.	.	.	do not involve sufficient inventiveness to merit patent protection”). 
 11. 35 U.S.C §	271(a) (2012). The exclusive rights of the patentee also include the 
right to offer the claimed invention for sale and the right to import it into the United 
States. Id. 
 12. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480 (1974) (exclusive rights 
permit inventors to recoup the costs of research and development). 
 13. See generally id. (“[T]he patent laws impose upon the inventor a requirement of 
disclosure.”). 
 14. White Consol. Indus., Inc. v. Vega Servo-Control, Inc., 713 F.2d 788, 790–91 (Fed. 
Cir. 1983) (citing Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 480). 
 15. MagSil Corp. v. Hitachi Glob. Storage Techs. Inc., 687 F.3d 1377, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 
2012); ALZA Corp. v. Andrx Pharm., LLC, 603 F.3d 935, 940 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
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use.”16 An enabling disclosure is an essential element of the “bargain” 
between a patent applicant and the public at large.17 Patentees receive 
exclusive rights in exchange for a concrete disclosure of how one may 
use the invention.18 Thus the enablement requirement exists “in order 
to extract meaningful disclosure of the invention and, by this 
disclosure, advance the technical arts.”19 
The source of the enablement requirement is the first paragraph 
of §	112, which states: 
The specification shall contain a written description of the 
invention, and of the manner and process of making and using 
it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any 
person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is 
most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set 
forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor	.	.	.	of 
carrying out the invention.20 
Section 112 is also the source of the best mode and written 
description requirements.21 The best mode requirement demands 
disclosure of what the applicant believed to be the best manner of 
practicing the invention at the time the application was filed.22 
Although the America Invents Act recently eliminated failure to 
disclose the best mode as a ground for challenging the validity of a 
patent,23 the best mode language nevertheless remains in §	112, and it 
 
 16. In re Angstadt, 537 F.2d 498, 502 (C.C.P.A. 1976). 
 17. See Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2011) 
(referring to patent rights as a “bargained-for-exchange” (quoting Eli Lilly & Co. v. Barr 
Labs., Inc., 251 F.3d 955, 963 (Fed. Cir. 2001))). 
 18. See Genentech, Inc. v. Novo Nordisk, A/S, 108 F.3d 1361, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1997) 
(“Patent protection is granted in return for an enabling disclosure of an invention, not for 
vague intimations of general ideas that may or may not be workable.”). In the context of 
the utility requirement, which demands that a patented invention be “useful,” the 
Supreme Court has observed that a patent is “not a hunting license.” Brenner v. Manson, 
383 U.S. 519, 536 (1966). 
 19. Invitrogen Corp. v. Clontech Labs., Inc., 429 F.3d 1052, 1070 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 20. 35 U.S.C. §	112(a) (2012). 
 21. Id. 
 22. See High Concrete Structures, Inc. v. New Enter. Stone & Lime Co., 377 F.3d 
1379, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (the best mode requirement bars inventors from “concealing 
from the public preferred embodiments of their inventions which they have in fact 
conceived” (quoting In re Gay, 309 F.2d 769, 772 (C.C.P.A. 1962))); Bayer AG v. Schein 
Pharm., Inc., 301 F.3d 1306, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“[T]he existence of a best mode is a 
purely subjective matter depending on what the inventor actually believed at the time the 
application was filed.”). 
 23. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, §	15(a)(3)(A), 125 Stat. 
284, 328 (2011) (“[T]he failure to disclose the best mode shall not be a basis on which any 
claim of a patent may be canceled or held invalid or otherwise unenforceable	.	.	.	.”) 
(codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §	282(b)(3)(A) (2012)). 
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may shed some light on the distinct nature of the enablement 
requirement. The written description requirement demands that the 
patent specification demonstrate “possession” by the applicant of the 
invention claimed.24 A principal function of the written description 
requirement is to ensure that patent claims, which may change during 
prosecution, do not stray from the invention disclosed in the 
application originally filed.25 If, after amendment, the claims no 
longer match the invention described in the specification, one cannot 
rely on the filing date of the application to resolve important 
questions of priority.26 In recent years, courts have also used the 
written description requirement to invalidate claims that are broader 
than the invention the applicant actually “possessed,” even in cases 
where the claims did not change during prosecution.27 Applied in this 
way, the written description requirement overlaps substantially with 
the enablement requirement.28 
Patent disclosures are directed to persons of ordinary skill in the 
art,29 and whether a disclosure is enabling must be judged from their 
 
 24. Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en 
banc) (to satisfy the description requirement, a patent specification must “reasonably 
convey[] to those skilled in the art that the inventor had possession of the claimed subject 
matter as of the filing date”). 
 25. See In re Wright, 866 F.2d 422, 424 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (“When the scope of a claim 
has been changed by amendment in such a way as to justify an assertion that it is directed 
to a different invention	.	.	.	[one asks] whether the newly claimed subject matter was 
described in the patent application when filed	.	.	.	.”). 
 26. See Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 363 F.3d 1247, 1255 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (if not 
for the written description requirement, applicants “could add new matter to their 
disclosures and date them back to their original filing date, thus defeating an accurate 
accounting of the priority of invention”). 
 27. See Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1349. 
 28. See LizardTech, Inc. v. Earth Res. Mapping, Inc., 424 F.3d 1336, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 
2005) (when the issue is that of the breadth of the disclosure, the written description and 
enablement requirements “usually rise and fall together”). The written description and 
enablement requirements are, nevertheless, distinct. Alcon Research Ltd. v. Barr Labs., 
Inc., 745 F.3d 1180, 1188 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (referring to “two separate and independent 
requirements”); Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“[I]t is 
possible for a specification to enable the practice of an invention as broadly as it is 
claimed, and still not describe that invention.” (quoting In re DiLeone, 436 F.2d 1404, 1405 
(C.C.P.A. 1971))). The enablement requirement is “more indulgent” than the written 
description requirement because omitted details can be supplied through the knowledge 
possessed by persons of ordinary skill. See Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 
314 F.3d 1313, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“[T]he [enablement] requirement is satisfied if, given 
what they already know, the specification teaches those in the art enough that they can 
make and use the invention	.	.	.	.”). 
 29. Patent law often calls on the perspective of the hypothetical “person of ordinary 
skill in the art,” just as tort law often calls on the perspective of the hypothetical 
“reasonable person.” The “person of ordinary skill” does not possess the ingenuity of an 
inventor, but only the typical competence of workers in the field. See Standard Oil Co. v. 
94 N.C. L. REV. 1099 (2016) 
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perspective.30 The specification need not disclose, and preferably 
omits, information that would already be known to those of ordinary 
skill.31 Although the phrase “undue experimentation” does not 
appear in the statute, courts have long held that the need for some 
experimentation before one can make or use the invention is not 
fatal.32 Consequently, the enablement requirement looks to the 
information disclosed in the patent specification, the information 
already available in the art, and additional information that might be 
gleaned by those of ordinary skill through experimentation that is not 
“undue.”33 Minor details may be omitted from the disclosure,34 in the 
expectation that persons skilled in the art, armed with the general 
knowledge available to such persons, may be able to fill gaps and 
 
Am. Cyanamid Co., 774 F.2d 448, 454 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (the person of ordinary skill “thinks 
along the line of conventional wisdom”). The person of ordinary skill is, however, “a 
person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 
398, 420 (2007). 
 30. See Cephalon, Inc. v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 707 F.3d 1330, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2013) 
(the enablement requirement is satisfied if “at the time of filing the application one skilled 
in the art, having read the specification, could practice the invention without ‘undue 
experimentation’	”); Elan Pharm., Inc. v. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research, 346 
F.3d 1051, 1055 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (the enablement inquiry is “from the viewpoint of persons 
experienced in the field of the invention”); Singh v. Brake, 317 F.3d 1334, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 
2003) (“[E]nablement	.	.	.	looks to the objective knowledge of one of ordinary skill in the 
art.” (quoting Glaxo Inc. v. Novopharm Ltd., 52 F.3d 1043, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 1995))). 
 31. Streck, Inc. v. Research & Diagnostic Sys., Inc., 665 F.3d 1269, 1288 (Fed. Cir. 
2012) (“[A] specification need not disclose what is well-known in the art.”); LizardTech, 
424 F.3d at 1345 (“[T]he patent specification is written for a person of skill in the art, and 
such a person comes to the patent with the knowledge of what has come before.”); 
Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (“[A] 
patent need not teach, and preferably omits, what is well known in the art.”). 
 32. Cephalon, 707 F.3d at 1336 (“[A] reasonable amount of routine 
experimentation	.	.	.	does not violate the enablement requirement.”); ALZA Corp. v. 
Andrx Pharm., LLC, 603 F.3d 935, 940 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“Enablement is not precluded 
where a ‘reasonable’ amount of routine experimentation is required to practice a claimed 
invention	.	.	.	.”); In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (the qualifier of “undue 
experimentation” is “well established”). 
 33. See Warner-Lambert Co. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 418 F.3d 1326, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 
2005) (“[T]he specification need only teach those aspects of the invention that one skilled 
in the art could not figure out without undue experimentation.”); Invitrogen Corp. v. 
Clontech Labs., Inc., 429 F.3d 1052, 1070–71 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“The scope of 
enablement	.	.	.	is that which is disclosed in the specification plus	.	.	.	what would be known 
to one of ordinary skill in the art without undue experimentation.” (quoting Nat’l 
Recovery Techs., Inc. v. Magnetic Separation Sys., Inc., 166 F.3d 1190, 1196 (Fed. Cir. 
1999))). 
 34. Adang v. Fischhoff, 286 F.3d 1346, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“It is well settled that 
‘omission of minor details does not cause a specification to fail to meet the enablement 
requirement.’	” (quoting Genentech, Inc. v. Novo Nordisk, A/S, 108 F.3d 1361, 1366 (Fed. 
Cir. 1997))). 
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extrapolate as necessary to practice the claimed invention.35 On the 
other hand, a patent applicant cannot rely entirely on the knowledge 
possessed by those of ordinary skill to supply an enabling disclosure. 
It is a matter of supplementation only,36 and the novel aspects of the 
invention, in particular, must be supported by the teachings of the 
specification.37 
When enablement arises as a validity defense in litigation, or as a 
reason for rejecting a patent application, the dispute is typically over 
whether undue experimentation would be required in order to make 
and use the invention.38 Because some experimentation is permitted, 
the “key word” in the inquiry is “undue.”39 The decision “is not a 
single, simple factual determination, but rather is a conclusion 
reached by weighing many factual considerations.”40 Those 
considerations concern the relationship between the claimed 
invention, the disclosures included in the patent specification, and the 
knowledge and abilities of persons of ordinary skill.41 A well-
established list of factors, known as the Wands factors, figures 
routinely in the enablement decisions of the Federal Circuit Court of 
Appeals. These factors are: 
(1) the quantity of experimentation necessary, (2) the amount 
of direction or guidance presented, (3) the presence or absence 
of working examples,42 (4) the nature of the invention, (5) the 
 
 35. See AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac, 344 F.3d 1234, 1244 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“[T]he artisan’s 
knowledge of the prior art and routine experimentation can often fill gaps	.	.	.	.”). 
 36. Streck, 665 F.3d at 1288 (use of knowledge available in the art is “merely a rule of 
supplementation, not a substitute for a basic enabling disclosure” (quoting ALZA, 603 
F.3d at 940–41)); ALZA, 603 F.3d at 941 (a patentee “cannot simply rely on the 
knowledge of a person of ordinary skill to serve as a substitute for the missing information 
in the specification”). 
 37. Auto. Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 501 F.3d 1274, 1283 (Fed. Cir. 
2007) (“It is the specification, not the knowledge of one skilled in the art, that must supply 
the novel aspects of an invention in order to constitute adequate enablement.” (quoting 
Genentech, Inc. v. Novo Nordisk, A/S, 108 F.3d 1361, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1997))). 
 38. See, e.g., ALZA, 603 F.3d at 940 (deciding whether the necessary experimentation 
is “undue”); Warner-Lambert, 418 F.3d at 1337 (same). 
 39. Warner-Lambert, 418 F.3d at 1337 (quoting In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. 
Cir. 1988)). 
 40. Cephalon, Inc. v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 707 F.3d 1330, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2013) 
(quoting ALZA, 603 F.3d at 940). 
 41. See Nat’l Recovery Techs., Inc. v. Magnetic Separation Sys., Inc., 166 F.3d 1190, 
1196 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
 42. “Working examples” are embodiments of the claimed invention that are disclosed 
in the specification and that have actually been reduced to practice by the patentee. See 
Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I. du Pont De Nemours & Co., 750 F.2d 1569, 1577 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 
1984) (distinguishing working examples and prophetic or “paper” examples). “Prophetic 
examples” are embodiments described in the specification that have not been reduced to 
94 N.C. L. REV. 1099 (2016) 
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state of the prior art, (6) the relative skill of those in the art, (7) 
the predictability or unpredictability of the art, and (8) the 
breadth of the claims.43 
The Wands factors are “illustrative” rather than “mandatory,”44 
meaning that only relevant factors need be considered in any 
particular case.45 
A factor of great significance is the kind of experimentation that 
would be required of a person skilled in the art, working from the 
patent disclosure, to produce a working embodiment of the invention. 
Whether experimentation is “undue” is a matter of degree,46 and the 
standard is one of reasonableness.47 The test is not solely 
quantitative;48 a “considerable amount of experimentation” is 
permitted, so long as it would be “	‘merely routine,’ or the 
specification provides ‘a reasonable amount of guidance.’	”49 For 
example, in In re Wands,50 the invention concerned laboratory-
produced antibodies capable of detecting the hepatitis B virus.51 A 
person skilled in the art desiring to practice the invention would have 
to isolate and clone specialized hybridoma cells, culture them in 
separate chambers, test the antibodies they produced to determine 
 
practice. Id. Prophetic examples are not forbidden. Id. A patentee can rely entirely on 
“constructive reduction to practice” through the filing of an application including an 
enabling disclosure. See Solvay S.A. v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 622 F.3d 1367, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 
2010). 
 43. Streck, Inc. v. Research & Diagnostic Sys., Inc., 665 F.3d 1269, 1288 (Fed. Cir. 
2012) (quoting In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988)); see also Cephalon, 707 
F.3d at 1336; ALZA, 603 F.3d at 940. 
 44. Cephalon, 707 F.3d at 1336; Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 
1213 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
 45. See Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Calgene, Inc., 188 F.3d 1362, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (not 
all of the Wands factors need be considered because “[w]hat is relevant depends on the 
facts” (quoting Amgen, 927 F.2d at 1213)). 
 46. Wyeth & Cordis Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 720 F.3d 1380, 1385–86 (Fed. Cir. 2013); 
Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 363 F.3d 1247, 1253 (Fed. Cir. 2004); PPG Indus., Inc. v. 
Guardian Indus. Corp., 75 F.3d 1558, 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
 47. See Cephalon, 707 F.3d at 1336 (“[A] reasonable amount of routine 
experimentation	.	.	.	does not violate the enablement requirement.”); ALZA, 603 F.3d at 
940 (“[A] ‘reasonable’ amount of routine experimentation” is permissible.); In re Wands, 
858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“The determination of what constitutes undue 
experimentation in a given case requires the application of a standard of 
reasonableness	.	.	.	.”); Ansul Co. v. Uniroyal, Inc., 448 F.2d 872, 878–79 (2d Cir. 1971) 
(finding that the disclosure “did not place an unreasonable burden upon one skilled in the 
art”). 
 48. Cephalon, 707 F.3d at 1339; PPG, 75 F.3d at 1564; Wands, 858 F.2d at 737. 
 49. Wyeth, 720 F.3d at 1386 (quoting Johns Hopkins Univ. v. CellPro, Inc., 152 F.3d 
1342, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). 
 50. 858 F.2d 731 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
 51. Id. at 733. 
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which would bind to the hepatitis B antigen, and engage in further 
screening to identify those antibodies having the qualities required by 
the patent claims.52 The court found that the required 
experimentation was not undue because, however time consuming 
and complex, it would be routine for persons skilled in the art.53 The 
level of skill in the art was high, the specification provided extensive 
guidance, and the techniques required to produce and screen the 
antibodies were well known.54 In short, “extensive experimentation” 
may not be “undue” where “the experiments involve repetition of 
known or commonly used techniques.”55 
On the other hand, some courts have used the term “unduly 
extensive” experimentation, rather than “undue” experimentation, to 
mark the limit of enablement,56 or they have noted that the flexibility 
allowing for routine experimentation is “not without bounds.”57 
Although quantitative limits are not the sole criterion, experiments 
that would require months or years may well be “unduly extensive.”58 
In White Consolidated Industries, Inc. v. Vega Servo-Control, Inc.,59 
the patentee omitted from the specification the software code 
necessary to operate the patented machine tool.60 It would have 
required “from 1½ to 2 man years of effort” for persons of ordinary 
skill to supply a substitute, which the court found to be “a clearly 
unreasonable requirement.”61 
The simplest form of enablement dispute arises where the parties 
debate whether the disclosures of the patent specification would allow 
a person of ordinary skill in the art to practice the claimed invention 
in any manner, without the need for undue experimentation. In 
 
 52. Id. at 737–38. 
 53. Id. at 740. 
 54. Id.; see also Alcon Research Ltd. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 745 F.3d 1180, 1188 (Fed. Cir. 
2014) (referring to experimentation that “is either ‘undue’ or sufficiently routine that an 
ordinarily skilled artisan would reasonably be expected to carry it out”); Johns Hopkins 
Univ. v. CellPro, Inc., 152 F.3d 1342, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“[R]outine experimentation 
does not constitute undue experimentation	.	.	.	.”). 
 55. Cephalon, Inc. v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 707 F.3d 1330, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
 56. See, e.g., Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 363 F.3d 1247, 1253 (Fed. Cir. 2004) 
(emphasis added) (quoting PPG Indus., Inc. v. Guardian Indus., Corp., 75 F.3d 1558, 1564 
(Fed. Cir. 1996)); Nat’l Recovery Techs. v. Magnetic Separation Sys., Inc., 166 F.3d 1190, 
1197 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (emphasis added). 
 57. Wyeth & Cordis Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 720 F.3d 1380, 1386 (Fed. Cir. 2013) 
(quoting Cephalon, 707 F.3d at 1339). 
 58. See In re Ghiron, 442 F.2d 985, 992 (C.C.P.A. 1971) (a period of “many months or 
years	.	.	.	does not bespeak of a routine operation”). 
 59. 713 F.2d 788 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
 60. Id. at 790. 
 61. Id. at 791. 
94 N.C. L. REV. 1099 (2016) 
1110 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94 
National Recovery Technologies, Inc. v. Magnetic Separation Systems, 
Inc.,62 the invention was a system for separating recyclable containers 
that took advantage of the fact that different types of plastic absorb 
different amounts of electromagnetic radiation.63 If the radiation 
passed through an irregularity in the container (through a fold, for 
example), this confused the results.64 Consequently, the claims 
required that one using the invention “select[] for processing” only 
signals representative of radiation that did not pass through such 
irregularities.65 The patent did not provide a method for identifying 
those signals, but suggested, as a “good proxy,” treating the signals 
associated with the highest transmission rates as those that were not 
tainted by irregularities.66 The court held that “enabling a proxy for 
the claimed invention is not the same as enabling the claimed 
invention itself.”67 The patent specification “[did] not at all purport to 
enable one of ordinary skill in the art to determine where 
irregularities exist in the containers.”68 As a result, one could not 
practice the claimed invention in any manner without undue 
experimentation.69 
Although, in any given case, conclusions may differ as to whether 
undue experimentation would be required before the invention could 
be practiced at all, the analytical framework, based on the Wands 
factors, is uncontroversial. However, as discussed in the next Part, 
things become more complicated when the dispute concerns the scope 
of the claim. 
II.  SCOPE ENABLEMENT 
Patent claims define the boundaries of the patent owner’s 
exclusive rights.70 A hypothetical claim to a mousetrap might read: “A 
 
 62. 166 F.3d 1190 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
 63. See id. at 1192. 
 64. Id. 
 65. See id. at 1193–94. 
 66. See id. at 1197. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. Curiously, the court calls this “a classic example of a claim that is broader than 
the enablement as taught in the specification.” Id. at 1196. Unless the court is imagining 
the improbable case in which the containers have been presorted to eliminate 
irregularities, the case seems to have nothing to do with the breadth of the claim. On the 
contrary, the specification did not enable “at all” the system demanded by the claims. Id. 
at 1197. 
 69. Id. at 1197–98. 
 70. In re Warmerdam, 33 F.3d 1354, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (“It is the claims which 
define the metes and bounds of the invention entitled to the protection of the patent 
system.”). 
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mousetrap comprising: a spring, a trigger, a latch, and bait.” Any 
mousetrap having a spring, a trigger, a latch, and bait would fall 
within the scope of the claim.71 The claim does not embrace a 
particular mousetrap, but a class of mousetraps distinguished by the 
inclusion of a spring, a trigger, a latch, and bait.72 The spring, the 
trigger, the latch, and the bait of an infringing mousetrap could take 
any number of forms—various materials or designs—so long as the 
variants still fell within the meaning of those terms. The patent 
specification would disclose, in detail, the patentee’s own preferred 
embodiments—representative examples of the invention, including 
the patentee’s “best mode.” While those embodiments might be used 
to interpret the meaning of the claim (e.g., what qualifies as “bait”), 
the patentee’s rights are not limited to those specific examples.73 
Because it is the nature of patent claims to embrace classes of 
things rather than specific embodiments, courts have long been aware 
of the danger that a claim may encompass more than the patentee’s 
contribution to the arts. O’Reilly v. Morse74 provides a famous 
example. Morse, the inventor of the telegraph, included one claim in 
his patent that would have covered any use of electromagnetism for 
printing characters at a distance.75 The Court held that claim 
unpatentable, observing that it would impinge on the discoveries of 
future inventors who did not employ any of the specific means 
disclosed in Morse’s specification.76 Morse would be allowed to patent 
his invention, but not every means of accomplishing the same thing. 
Since then, courts have rejected claims found to be broader than the 
patentee’s invention on a number of grounds: under the subject 
matter provision of the Patent Act,77 denying patents to “abstract 
 
 71. Because the claim includes the open-ended term “comprising,” mousetraps that 
have elements in addition to those set forth in the claim (e.g., a bell that sounds when a 
mouse is captured) would also come within its scope. See Free Motion Fitness, Inc. v. 
Cybex Int’l, Inc., 423 F.3d 1343, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“Basic patent law holds that a party 
may not avoid infringement of a patent claim using an open transitional phrase, such as 
comprising, by adding additional elements.”). 
 72. See Kevin Emerson Collins, The Reach of Literal Claim Scope into After-Arising 
Technology: On Thing Construction and the Meaning of Meaning, 41 CONN. L. REV. 493, 
501 (2008) (claims “specify the necessary and sufficient criteria for the inclusion of a thing 
within the set of things” over which the patentee has exclusive rights). 
 73. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) 
(“[A]lthough the specification often describes very specific embodiments of the invention, 
we have repeatedly warned against confining the claims to those embodiments.”). 
 74. 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62 (1854). 
 75. Id. at 112. 
 76. Id. at 113. 
 77. 35 U.S.C. §	101 (2012). 
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ideas;”78 under the written description requirement, which demands 
that the disclosures of the specification demonstrate “possession” of 
the claimed invention;79 and under the enablement requirement. 
The enablement requirement comes into play because courts 
require that the patent disclosure be “commensurate in scope” with 
the territory covered by the claim.80 In other words, one must ask not 
only whether the disclosure allows the invention to be made and used 
(what one might call “basic enablement” or “general enablement”), 
one must also ask whether the teachings of the specification justify a 
claim of broader scope than the preferred embodiments.81 An 
enabling disclosure that matches the scope of the claims is said to be 
an essential part of the “quid pro quo of the patent bargain.”82 A 
patentee who chooses broad claims, and who expects the far-reaching 
exclusive rights that accompany them, must provide teachings of 
comparable breadth.83 This ensures that “the public knowledge is 
enriched” in a proportionate manner.84 
 
 78. See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 64–68 (1972) (rejecting a claim to a 
computer algorithm that was not confined “to any particular art or technology, to any 
particular apparatus or machinery, or to any particular end use”); Dan L. Burke & Mark 
A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1642 (2003) (“The rule 
against patenting abstract ideas, while couched in terms of patentable subject matter, is 
really a judicial effort to restrict the permissible scope of patents and to channel patent 
protection towards finished products.”). 
 79. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. For example, in In re Curtis, 354 F.3d 
1347 (Fed. Cir. 2004), the applicant claimed a dental floss made of PTFE (Teflon) with a 
friction-enhancing coating. Id. at 1352. Although the applicant disclosed only one 
coating—microcrystalline wax—he claimed the broad genus of all such coatings that 
would adhere to the Teflon. Id. at 1353. Given the difficulty of discovering materials that 
will stick to a Teflon surface, the court held that the applicant had not demonstrated 
possession of the broader genus. Id. 
 80. See Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 363 F.3d 1247, 1253 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (quoting 
In re Hyatt, 708 F.2d 712, 714 (Fed. Cir. 1983)); Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 
F.2d 1200, 1213 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“[W]hat is necessary is that [the applicant] provide a 
disclosure sufficient to enable one skilled in the art to carry out the invention 
commensurate with the scope of [the] claims.”). 
 81. See In re Cortright, 165 F.3d 1353, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (distinguishing between 
“general enablement rejection[s]” where the specification “does not teach how to make or 
use the invention” and “scope of enablement rejection[s] where the written description 
enables something within the scope of the claims, but the claims are not limited to that 
scope”). 
 82. Sitrick v. Dreamworks, LLC, 516 F.3d 993, 999 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (quoting AK Steel 
Corp. v. Sollac, 344 F.3d 1234, 1244 (Fed. Cir. 2003)); LizardTech, Inc. v. Earth Res. 
Mapping, Inc., 424 F.3d 1336, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 83. Sitrick, 516 F.3d at 999 (“A patentee who chooses broad claim language must 
make sure the broad claims are fully enabled.”). 
 84. MagSil Corp. v. Hitachi Glob. Storage Techs., Inc., 687 F.3d 1377, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 
2012) (quoting Sitrick, 516 F.3d at 999). 
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In some cases, addressing the scope of enablement is much the 
same as addressing basic enablement. Those are the cases where the 
patentee (or applicant) argues that the teachings of the patent do 
allow persons skilled in the art to make and use the invention as 
broadly as claimed, without undue experimentation. Although the 
claims embrace embodiments not specifically disclosed, those 
alternatives may (or may not) remain within reach through the 
combination of the patent’s teachings, the knowledge available in the 
art, the predictability of the art, and the fruits of reasonable 
experimentation. 
Streck, Inc. v. Research & Diagnostic Systems, Inc.85 is a case 
where a claim broader in scope than the disclosed embodiments was 
nevertheless adequately enabled. The patent concerned blood 
“control” samples used to monitor the accuracy of laboratory 
equipment.86 The claims required a control including both a white 
blood cell component and a reticulocyte component, the latter 
consisting of either true reticulocytes or reticulocyte analogs.87 The 
defendant conceded that the disclosures enabled controls with 
reticulocyte analogs (the form of the invention in which the patentee 
had reduced it to practice), but argued that the patent did not enable 
true reticulocytes, as used in the accused product.88 The court found 
that the specification enabled the “full scope of the claimed 
invention,” including true reticulocytes, because persons skilled in the 
art, following the teachings of the patent, could have substituted true 
reticulocytes for reticulocyte analogs without undue 
experimentation.89 True reticulocytes and reticulocyte analogs are 
“virtually indistinguishable” and “work in exactly the same way.”90 
A contrary example can be found in Wyeth & Cordis Corp. v. 
Abbott Laboratories,91 where the invention concerned the use of 
rapamycin to prevent arterial blockages from returning after a 
balloon angioplasty procedure. The claims called for administering 
rapamycin, but the specification disclosed only sirolimus, one species 
of rapamycin.92 Rapamycin is actually a broad genus of tens of 
 
 85. 665 F.3d 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
 86. Id. at 1274. 
 87. Id. at 1276–77. 
 88. Id. at 1287. 
 89. Id. at 1288–89 (quoting ALZA Corp. v. Andrx Pharm., LLC, 603 F.3d 935, 940 
(Fed. Cir. 2010)). 
 90. Id. 
 91. 720 F.3d 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
 92. Id. at 1382. 
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thousands of compounds.93 Even small changes in the sirolimus 
molecule could alter its effect, and one skilled in the art would have 
to undertake laborious testing to determine which of the thousands of 
rapamycin compounds could prevent the return of an arterial 
blockage.94 The court found no genuine dispute that practicing the full 
scope of the claims would require “excessive experimentation.”95 
Where the question is whether one could or could not practice 
undisclosed embodiments without undue experimentation, the Wands 
factors are precisely what is needed. The patent specification may 
point researchers in the right direction or, as in Streck, provide a 
working example close to the alternative embraced by the claim. 
Alternatively, it may do nothing more than “[t]oss[] out the mere 
germ of an idea,”96 leaving it to those skilled in the art to work out the 
rest. The knowledge already available in the art may allow 
practitioners to “fill gaps, interpolate between embodiments, and 
perhaps even extrapolate beyond the disclosed embodiments	.	.	.	.”97 If 
the level of skill in the art is high, more successful “interpolation” can 
be expected.98 
Another important factor is the “predictability” of the art. Gaps 
in the disclosure are bridged more easily when results can be 
predicted in advance. Accordingly, courts have observed that the 
scope of enablement varies inversely with the unpredictability of the 
art.99 In predictable arts, even “a single embodiment provides broad 
enablement in the sense that, once imagined, other embodiments can 
be made without difficulty and their performance characteristics 
predicted by resort to known scientific laws.”100 In unpredictable arts, 
researchers may have little idea of what to expect until they have 
tested alternatives to the embodiments disclosed in the patent. In 
Adang v. Fischhoff,101 the invention concerned plant cells genetically 
modified to confer resistance to insects. The claims covered the use of 
the technique with tomato and other plants, but the specification only 
 
 93. Id. at 1384–85. 
 94. Id. at 1385. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Calgene, Inc., 188 F.3d 1362, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (quoting 
Genentech, Inc. v. Novo Nordisk, A/S, 108 F.3d 1361, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1997)). 
 97. Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 363 F.3d 1247, 1253 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (quoting 
AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac, 344 F.3d 1234, 1244 (Fed. Cir. 2003)). 
 98. See In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 740 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (referring to a high level of 
skill and well-known techniques). 
 99. In re Angstadt, 537 F.2d 498, 502 (C.C.P.A. 1976); In re Fisher, 427 F.2d 833, 839 
(C.C.P.A. 1970). 
 100. In re Fisher, 427 F.2d at 839. 
 101. 286 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
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demonstrated success with tobacco.102 The court found the claims 
inadequately enabled, in large part because the art was so 
unpredictable that one could not expect success with one species to be 
transferred to another.103 
Courts have sometimes suggested that a narrow disclosure—
possibly the disclosure of a single embodiment—can enable a broad 
claim in the “mechanical” arts, because outcomes in such arts are 
predictable based on the application of well-understood physical 
laws.104 In contrast, patents in the chemical and biological arts require 
more extensive disclosure to support broad claims, because those arts 
are inherently unpredictable.105 In other cases, courts have shied away 
from the mechanical/chemical distinction—perhaps because the 
principles of the latter arts have become better understood—in favor 
of a general distinction between technologies that are predictable or 
unpredictable.106 
A. Incomplete Enablement 
When the parties dispute whether gaps in the disclosure can be 
bridged without undue experimentation, resolving the issue may be 
difficult.107 It is a fact-intensive inquiry with a strong theoretical 
component. Nevertheless, as when the parties dispute whether the 
patentee’s disclosures allow the invention to be practiced at all, there 
are few controversies over the legal framework. The Wands factors 
are firmly established. The hard cases, from a legal/policy point of 
view, are those where the issue is not whether a particular 
 
 102. Id. at 1356. 
 103. See id. (relaying the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences’ finding that “the 
successful transformation of plant cells using vectors	.	.	.	is not necessarily predictable prior 
to attempting a desired transformation” (quoting Fischhoff v. Adang, No. 103,324 
(B.P.A.I. Sept. 29, 2000) (unpublished slip opinion) (alteration in original)). 
 104. See Spectra-Physics, Inc. v. Coherent, Inc., 827 F.2d 1524, 1533 (Fed. Cir. 1987) 
(“If an invention pertains to an art where the results are predictable, e.g., mechanical as 
opposed to chemical arts, a broad claim can be enabled by disclosure of a single 
embodiment	.	.	.	.”); In re Vickers, 141 F.2d 522, 525 (C.C.P.A. 1944) (“[O]rdinarily in a 
mechanical case broad claims may be supported by a disclosure of a single form of the 
apparatus disclosed in an application.”). 
 105. See In re Hogan, 559 F.2d 595, 606 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (referring to “the high level of 
predictability in mechanical or electrical environments and the lower level of predictability 
expected in chemical reactions and physiological activity”). 
 106. See, e.g., In re Cook, 439 F.2d 730, 734 (C.C.P.A. 1971) (“This dichotomy	.	.	.	we 
would prefer to see denominated a dichotomy between predictable and unpredictable 
factors in any art rather than between ‘mechanical cases’ and ‘chemical cases’	.	.	.	.”). 
 107. See In re Bowen, 492 F.2d 859, 861 (C.C.P.A. 1974) (“Whether, in a particular 
case, the requisite ‘reasonable correlation’ between the scope of claims and the scope of 
enablement provided by the specification exists is often a difficult question.”). 
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embodiment of the claimed invention could be made or used, but 
whether it actually matters. In other words, can a claim be valid even 
if it embraces some embodiments that cannot be practiced without 
undue experimentation? Here the Wands factors are no longer 
relevant. 
The simplest answer is that the specification must enable every 
embodiment within the scope of the claim to be made and used 
without undue experimentation. Courts frequently employ language 
that suggests that simple approach. It is said, for example, that the 
specification, to be enabling, must teach how to make and use the 
“full scope” of the claimed invention.108 In a more mathematical vein, 
courts say that “[t]he scope of the claims must be less than or equal to 
the scope of the enablement	.	.	.	.”109 The problem is that a rigid 
application of that rule would invalidate nearly every patent claim. 
For example, unless the science of spring design has come to an end, 
inevitably a mousetrap claim calling for a “spring” will include some 
embodiments that the inventor did not specifically disclose and that 
persons skilled in the art could not make or use without extensive 
experimentation. New springs, for example, might be made from 
exotic metal alloys requiring years of development, yet be perfectly 
suited for use in a basic mousetrap. Only patentees who limited 
themselves to “picture claims”—claims so constricted that they track 
every detail of the preferred embodiments110—could hope to survive 
an enablement challenge. 
 
 108. See, e.g., MagSil Corp. v. Hitachi Glob. Storage Techs., Inc., 687 F.3d 1377, 1381 
(Fed. Cir. 2012) (“[A] patentee chooses broad claim language at the peril of losing any 
claim that cannot be enabled across its full scope of coverage.”); Streck, Inc. v. Research & 
Diagnostic Sys., Inc., 665 F.3d 1269, 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“A patent’s specification must 
‘teach those skilled in the art how to make and use the full scope of the claimed 
invention	.	.	.	.’	” (quoting ALZA Corp. v. Andrx Pharm., LLC, 603 F.3d 935, 940 (Fed. 
Cir. 2010))); Sitrick v. Dreamworks, LLC, 516 F.3d 993, 999 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“The full 
scope of the claimed invention must be enabled.”); Monsanto Co. v. Syngenta Seeds, Inc., 
503 F.3d 1352, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“[T]he specification of the patent must teach those 
skilled in the art how to make and use the full scope of the claimed invention	.	.	.	.” 
(quoting In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1993))). MagSil also uses the term 
“entire scope.” MagSil, 687 F.3d at 1381. 
 109. MagSil, 687 F.3d at 1381 (quoting Sitrick, 516 F.3d at 999); see also Invitrogen 
Corp. v. Clontech Labs., Inc., 429 F.3d 1052, 1070 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“The scope of [patent] 
claims must be less than or equal to the scope of the enablement.” (quoting Nat’l 
Recovery Techs., Inc. v. Magnetic Separation Sys., Inc., 166 F.3d 1190, 1196 (Fed. Cir. 
1999) (alteration in original))). 
 110. See M. Eagles Tool Warehouse, Inc. v. Fisher Tooling Co., 439 F.3d 1335, 1342 
(Fed. Cir. 2006) (a claim that “recites in detail nearly all of the features of the invention” is 
“often referred to as a ‘picture claim’	”). 
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However, a rigid application of the “less than or equal to” rule 
may not be what courts have in mind. Often courts refer to a 
“reasonable correlation” between the scope of the claims and the 
scope of the enablement,111 or “reasonable enablement” of the 
claims.112 But what does “reasonable,” in this context, mean? If it 
refers simply to a numerical percentage (e.g., ninety percent of the 
mousetraps within the scope of the claim can be practiced without 
undue experimentation), one wonders how such a percentage could 
ever be determined. One also wonders how often the number of 
enabled embodiments would be more than an infinitesimal 
proportion of all of the variations made possible by continuing 
innovation in the technological arts, including that of spring design. 
Aware of these pitfalls, courts have sometimes said that, because 
“[t]he law does not require the impossible,” an applicant need not 
“describe in his specification every conceivable and possible future 
embodiment of his invention.”113 
In order to understand when embodiments of the claimed 
invention may reasonably be omitted from the scope of enablement, it 
may be illuminating to consider some of the cases in which the courts 
found omissions unreasonable. These can be roughly divided into 
three categories: cases involving a distinct alternative to an enabled 
embodiment, cases involving a broad genus including an enabled 
species, and cases involving a numerical range on which the claims 
place no limit. 
1. Distinct Alternatives 
In AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac,114 the patents concerned a method of 
applying an aluminum coating to strips of stainless steel.115 If the 
aluminum does not adhere well to the steel, it may flake off when the 
 
 111. “The scope of the claims must bear a reasonable correlation to the scope of the 
enablement provided by the specification to persons of ordinary skill in the art.” In re 
Fisher, 427 F.2d 833, 839 (C.C.P.A. 1970); see also MagSil, 687 F.3d at 1381; Invitrogen, 
429 F.3d at 1071; Genentech, Inc. v. Novo Nordisk, A/S, 108 F.3d 1361, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 
1997); In re Vaeck, 947 F.2d 488, 495 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
 112. See Auto. Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 501 F.3d 1274, 1285 (Fed. Cir. 
2007) (quoting Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 481 F.3d 1371, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 
2007)); AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac, 344 F.3d 1234, 1244 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“[W]hen a range is 
claimed, there must be reasonable enablement of the scope of the range.”). 
 113. SRI Int’l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp., 775 F.2d 1107, 1121 (Fed. Cir. 1985); see also 
U.S. Steel Corp. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 865 F.2d 1247, 1251–52 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (the 
state of the art at the time of filing is critical). 
 114. 344 F.3d 1234 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 115. Id. at 1234. 
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strip is bent.116 The inventors addressed the problem by keeping the 
steel strips in a hydrogen atmosphere until they were dipped into the 
aluminum-coating bath.117 The inventors believed that the invention 
would only work with substantially pure “Type 2 aluminum,”118 and 
the patent disclosures “clearly and strongly warn[ed]” that one should 
avoid “Type 1 aluminum,” which includes a significant proportion of 
silicon.119 However, the inventors eventually obtained broad claims 
requiring only the use of “aluminum or aluminum alloys” (a term that 
includes Type 1 aluminum) and alluding to the end result that the 
aluminum layer is “tightly adherent to the strip and resistant to	.	.	. 
flaking during bending.”120 Because the specifications did not teach 
any manner of achieving that result except with Type 2 aluminum, the 
court found that the disclosures failed to enable the full scope of the 
claims.121 In fact, teaching against the use of Type 1 aluminum was 
“[w]orse than being silent as to that aspect of the invention,” because 
it discouraged experimentation.122 The specifications “tell[] the public 
that higher amounts of silicon will not work.”123 
Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc.124 is a similar case. The 
patented invention involved a mechanism for injecting pressurized 
fluids, such as contrast media, into patients.125 All of the disclosed 
embodiments included a “pressure jacket” to prevent the syringe 
from bursting.126 The specification warned that syringes capable of 
operating without a pressure jacket would be expensive and 
impractical.127 The inventors had explored the possibility of a 
jacketless injector but abandoned the effort as “too risky.”128 The 
patent claims, as originally filed, each included a pressure jacket 
limitation, but when the inventors became aware of the defendant’s 
jacketless design they modified the claims to remove those 
limitations.129 Although the broadened claims covered injectors with 
 
 116. Id. at 1236. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 1240. 
 119. Id. at 1244. 
 120. Id. at 1237. 
 121. Id. at 1244. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. 481 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 125. Id. at 1373. 
 126. Id. at 1379. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 1374. 
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and without pressure jackets,130 the court found the patent invalid 
because the disclosures did not enable the full scope of the claims.131 
The failure of the specification to suggest how a jacketless system 
could be made, its warning that such designs were “impractical,” and 
the inventors’ own failure to produce a jacketless design, all 
supported the conclusion that “undue experimentation” would be 
required before one could practice the invention as broadly as it was 
claimed.132 The court ended by remarking: “[t]he motto, ‘beware of 
what one asks for,’ might be applicable here.”133 
Thus, in both AK Steel and Liebel-Flarsheim, the embodiment 
that the specification failed to enable (the use of Type 1 aluminum 
and the elimination of the pressure jacket) was not just one of a 
countless number of undisclosed alternatives. In each case, the 
patentee deliberately excluded the alternative from the claims as 
originally filed, warned against the alternative in the patent 
disclosures, and broadened the claims to include the alternative only 
after discovering that competitors had managed to adopt it. Yet there 
are cases reaching similar results where the patentee did not “teach 
away” from the nonenabled alternative, but tried from the beginning 
to embrace it. 
One such case is Automotive Technologies International, Inc. v. 
BMW of North America, Inc.134 The invention concerned a crash 
sensor to trigger an airbag in a side-impact collision.135 Earlier side-
impact sensors had been crush sensors triggered only when deformed 
by an impact. These were ineffective unless struck directly.136 The 
“conventional wisdom” was that velocity sensors, triggered by sudden 
changes in velocity and used successfully with front-impact airbags, 
would not react fast enough to be effective in side-impact collisions.137 
However, the inventors discovered that velocity sensors could be 
effective in that application if properly designed.138 The claims called 
for a side-impact crash sensor incorporating a mass, and a “means 
 
 130. See id. at 1374–75. 
 131. Id. at 1380 (“[T]he asserted claims read on, and the full scope of the claimed 
invention includes, an injector system with and without a pressure jacket. There must be 
‘reasonable enablement of the scope of the range’ which, in this case, includes both 
injector systems with and without a pressure jacket.” (quoting AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac, 
344 F.3d 1234, 1244 (Fed. Cir. 2003))). 
 132. Id. at 1379. 
 133. Id. at 1380. 
 134. 501 F.3d 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 135. Id. at 1276–77. 
 136. Id. at 1277. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
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responsive to the motion of said mass	.	.	.	for initiating an occupant 
protection apparatus.”139 The specification taught that either a 
mechanical sensor or an electronic sensor could be used to detect the 
movement of the mass in situations calling for deployment of the 
airbag.140 A detailed drawing of a mechanical sensor showed a flapper 
that would move in a crash, closing an electrical circuit and triggering 
the airbag.141 In contrast, the drawing of an electronic sensor, 
described in the specification as a “conceptional view,” depicted little 
more than rectangles representing the moving mass and its housing.142 
The specification stated that, in the electronic sensor, the motion of 
the mass “can be sensed by a variety of technologies using, for 
example, optics, resistance change, capacitance change or magnetic 
reluctance change.”143 
The court held that the claims covered both mechanical and 
electronic sensors, but the specification, by disclosing so few details 
about an electronic sensor, failed to enable the full scope of the 
claims.144 The court relied heavily on the contrast between the 
detailed disclosure of the mechanical sensor and the cursory depiction 
of the electronic version.145 The specification devoted two columns 
and five drawings to the mechanical sensor, but only one paragraph 
and a “very general view” to the electronic alternative.146 The latter 
was merely a concept with no disclosure of how an electronic sensor 
would be built or operated.147 Because side-impact sensors were “a 
new field”148 and the specification provided nothing more than “a 
starting point, a direction for further research,”149 one could not 
expect persons skilled in the art to implement electronic sensors 
without undue experimentation. In fact, the defendant’s expert 
 
 139. Id. 
 140. See id. at 1278. 
 141. See id. at 1277–78. 
 142. See id. at 1278, 1282–83; U.S. Patent No. 5,231,253 fig.11 col. 10 ll. 3–14 (filed June 
2, 1992). 
 143. Auto. Techs., 501 F.3d at 1278 (quoting ‘253 Patent col. 10 ll. 8–10). 
 144. Id. at 1285. 
 145. Id. at 1284 (“The inadequacy of the description of an electronic side impact sensor 
is highlighted by comparison with the extensive disclosure of how to make and use a 
mechanical side impact sensor	.	.	.	.	If such a disclosure is needed to enable making and 
using a mechanical side impact sensor, why is not a similar disclosure needed to enable 
making and using an electronic side impact sensor, which is an essential aspect of the 
invention?”). 
 146. Id. at 1282. 
 147. Id. at 1283. 
 148. Id. at 1284. 
 149. Id. (quoting Genentech, Inc. v. Novo Nordisk, A/S, 108 F.3d 1361, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 
1997)). 
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testified that “a great deal of experimentation” would be required to 
sense the motion of the mass electronically and process the resulting 
data.150 Consequently, the “[d]isclosure of only mechanical side 
impact sensors [did] not permit one skilled in the art to make and use 
the invention as broadly as it was claimed.”151 
The Federal Circuit came to a similar conclusion in Sitrick v. 
Dreamworks, LLC.152 Here the patent concerned technology for 
inserting a user-generated visual image into a preexisting audiovisual 
work.153 The claims covered the insertion of images into both video 
games and movies.154 The specification discussed how, in a video 
game, address and control signals representing particular characters 
could be intercepted and data corresponding to the user-created 
image substituted.155 The specification did not discuss how anything 
similar could be accomplished with a movie, which does not include 
separable character signals.156 In some undisclosed manner, the 
characters would have to be “carved out” of the scene and the user’s 
image substituted.157 The court found that the specification did not 
enable the full scope of the claimed invention: “Because the asserted 
claims are broad enough to cover both movies and video games, the 
patents must enable both embodiments. Even if the claims are 
enabled with respect to video games	.	.	.	the claims are not enabled if 
the patents do not also enable for movies.”158 
In Automotive Technologies, the patentee called attention to the 
problematic nature of the electronic sensor through its uniquely 
minimalist description.159 That may be one reason for the court’s 
conclusion that “[e]lectronic side impact sensors are not just another 
known species of a genus consisting of sensors, but are a distinctly 
different sensor.”160 In Sitrick, on the other hand, the specification was 
merely silent on the subject of movies.161 Nevertheless, the 
fundamental technological differences between movies and video 
games made clear that the former were not “just another species” of a 
 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. at 1285. 
 152. 516 F.3d 993 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 153. Id. at 994–96. 
 154. Id. at 996. 
 155. Id. at 997. 
 156. Id. at 1000. 
 157. See id. at 998–99. 
 158. Id. at 1000 (citation omitted). 
 159. See supra notes 140–43 and accompanying text. 
 160. Auto. Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 501 F.3d 1274, 1285 (Fed. Cir. 
2007). 
 161. See supra notes 153–56 and accompanying text. 
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common genus, but a “distinctly different” alternative. Expert 
testimony showed that “movies and video games are technically 
different,” so that one skilled in the art could not “take the teachings 
regarding video games and apply them to movies.”162 In fact, the 
techniques disclosed for use with video games had “no relevance to 
movies.”163 
In one respect, it is difficult to argue with the result in these 
cases. Each time the patentee tried to secure exclusive rights to an 
alternative that could not be made or used based on the teachings of 
the patent, even with the benefit of knowledge available in the art and 
the potential for reasonable experimentation. Yet doubts arise when 
one considers other alternatives that the patentees did not teach. The 
patent in Automotive Technologies disclosed one mechanical sensor 
in detail, but it did not discuss every mechanical sensor that might be 
devised, some of which would demand considerable ingenuity. Would 
the patent claims have been too broad even if limited to mechanical 
sensors? If the claims in Liebel-Flarsheim had each included a 
pressure jacket limitation, they would still have covered injectors that 
could only be made after long experimentation and further 
technological advancements—perhaps injectors with pressure jackets 
made from improbable or yet-to-be-discovered materials. Would 
these variations of a variation have doomed the patent? It may be 
important that in each case something distinguished the undisclosed 
embodiment as a “distinctly different”164 alternative—whether it was 
the treatment of the alternative in the specification (as a variant 
merely hinted at or positively discouraged), the omission of the 
alternative in the original claims, or simply an apples-and-oranges 
difference in technology between the disclosed and undisclosed 
embodiments. 
2. Genus and Species 
The preceding cases suggest two distinct roads, one not taken (or 
taught). Other cases, primarily in the chemical and biological arts, 
concern claims to broad genuses supported by the enabling disclosure 
of only a few species. One example, Wyeth & Cordis Corp. v. Abbott 
Laboratories, has already been discussed.165 The claims called for the 
use of rapamycin to prevent arterial blockages but taught only one 
 
 162. Sitrick, 516 F.3d at 1000. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Auto. Techs., 501 F.3d at 1285. 
 165. See supra notes 91–95 and accompanying text. 
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species of rapamycin, known as sirolimus.166 Because this left 
thousands of other rapamycin compounds to be tested for 
effectiveness, a task that would require “excessive experimentation,” 
the patentee had failed to enable “the full scope of the claims.”167 
A similar case is Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co.,168 
where the patentee claimed a technique of producing EPO (a protein 
that stimulates the production of red blood cells), or EPO analogs, 
through recombinant DNA technology.169 The patentee did not 
enable DNA sequences corresponding to the thousands of possible 
EPO analogs, and did not, therefore, provide a disclosure 
commensurate in scope with its “all-encompassing claims.”170 
Although “a patent applicant is entitled to claim his invention 
generically,”171 the disclosure here fell short: “There may be many 
other genetic sequences that code for EPO-type products [but] 
Amgen has told how to make and use only a few of them and is 
therefore not entitled to claim all of them.”172 The court noted “the 
structural complexity of the EPO gene” and “the manifold 
possibilities for change in its structure, with attendant uncertainty as 
to what utility will be possessed by these analogs.”173 
Where a claimed genus encompasses thousands of species and 
the specification teaches only a few, one may conclude based on the 
numbers alone that there is no “reasonable correlation” between the 
scope of enablement and the scope of the claims, at least if the 
unpredictability of the art makes it difficult to apply the teachings of 
the patent to the undisclosed species. In some genus/species cases 
there is the additional factor that the claims ignore recognized 
taxonomic distinctions that demonstrate the limited scope of the 
patent disclosure. One such distinction, appearing in a number of 
cases, is that between flowering plants that produce one leaf in the 
early stages of their development (known as “monocots”) and plants 
that produce two leaves (known as “dicots”). In Plant Genetic 
Systems, N.V. v. DeKalb Genetics Corp.,174 the patent claimed a 
 
 166. Wyeth & Cordis Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 720 F.3d 1380, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
 167. Id. at 1386. 
 168. 927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
 169. Id. at 1204. 
 170. Id. at 1213. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. at 1213–14. 
 173. Id. at 1214; see also In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1562–63 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (claims 
to vaccines for all pathogenic RNA viruses were not adequately enabled where the 
disclosures related to only one species of virus). 
 174. 315 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
94 N.C. L. REV. 1099 (2016) 
1124 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94 
technique for making plants resistant to certain herbicides through 
genetic engineering.175 All of the working examples were dicot plants, 
such as tobacco and tomato plants, whereas the accused product was 
a variety of corn, a monocot plant.176 Because the ability to genetically 
engineer monocot plants arrived only after the filing date of the 
patent, the court found that the full scope of claims, covering both 
dicot and monocot plants, was not enabled.177 
3. Unlimited Ranges 
Enablement shortfalls also arise in cases where the patent claims 
include an unlimited numerical range. A recent example is MagSil 
Corp. v. Hitachi Global Storage Technologies, Inc.178 The patent 
involved read-write sensors for hard disk data storage devices that 
rely on changes in electrical resistance.179 The inventors achieved 
changes in resistance of as much as 11.8%—considerably better than 
past efforts, which had effected a change of only 2.7%.180 The claims, 
however, called for “a change in the resistance [of] at least 10% at 
room temperature,”181 a range that extends from “at least 10% up to 
infinity.”182 As the art progressed, other experimenters achieved 
changes in resistance of more than 600%—still within the scope of the 
claims but by no means enabled by the patent disclosure.183 Having 
disclosed only “a marginal advancement,” the patentee was not 
entitled to claims covering “the modern dimensions of this art.”184 The 
teachings of the specification did not enable the claims “across [the] 
full scope of coverage.”185 
 
 175. Id. at 1337. 
 176. Id. at 1338. 
 177. Id. at 1340–42; see also Monsanto Co. v. Syngenta Seeds, Inc., 503 F.3d 1352, 
1361–62 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“broad functional language” covering genetic transformation of 
both dicot and monocot plant cells was not enabled before the transformation of monocot 
cells was possible); In re Goodman, 11 F.3d 1046, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (a single example 
of manufacturing mammalian peptides in dicot plant cells did not enable claims including 
monocot cells). A similar taxonomic distinction has been observed between eukaryotic 
and prokaryotic cells. See Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Calgene, Inc., 188 F.3d 1362, 1374 (Fed. 
Cir. 1999). 
 178. 687 F.3d 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
 179. Id. at 1378–79. 
 180. Id. at 1379–80. 
 181. Id. at 1379 (quoting U.S. Patent No. 5,629,922 col. 8 ll. 52–54 (filed Mar. 21, 
1995)). 
 182. Id. at 1382. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. at 1381. 
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Similarly, the Court of Custom and Patent Appeals held in In re 
Fisher186 that claims to therapeutic hormone compositions with 
potency recitations of “at least 1 International Unit of ACTH per 
milligram” were not adequately enabled by the disclosure of products 
having potencies of 1.11 to 2.30 International Units.187 The “	‘open-
ended’ recitation” of potency had “a lower limit but no upper 
limit.”188 The court concluded that, in this case, the patentee should 
not be “allowed to dominate all such compositions having potencies 
greater than 1.0, including future compositions having potencies far in 
excess of those obtainable from his teachings plus ordinary skill.”189 
The court observed that some claimed ranges have inherent limits. In 
the case of a “substantially pure” composition, the upper limit of 
purity is 100%.190 If the composition disclosed in the specification is 
already so pure that “the possible range of further purification [is] 
either small or nonexistent,” the range encompassed by the claim may 
be adequately enabled.191 However, in Fisher it “appear[ed] 
theoretically possible to achieve potencies far greater than those 
obtained by [the applicant].”192 
These principles are difficult to reconcile with another line of 
cases concerning improved manners of practicing the claimed 
invention. In CFMT, Inc. v. YieldUp International Corp.,193 the 
invention concerned a method of cleaning semiconductor wafers. The 
system disclosed in the patent performed poorly at first; wafers 
cleaned by the disclosed system, when subjected to laser scanning, 
looked “filthy.”194 Only after six months of experimenting and the 
adoption of “hundreds of modifications”—improvements made the 
subject of a later patent—were the inventors able to achieve a 
commercially satisfactory system.195 The court noted that one must 
 
 186. 427 F.2d 833 (C.C.P.A. 1970). 
 187. Id. at 839. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. at 839–40; see also Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 927 
F.2d 1565, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“Open ended claims are not inherently improper	.	.	.	. 
They may be supported if there is an inherent, albeit not precisely known, upper limit and 
the specification enables one of skill in the art to approach that limit.”). 
 192. In re Fisher, 427 F.2d at 840. 
 193. 349 F.3d 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 194. Id. at 1337 (quoting CFMT, Inc. v. YieldUp Int’l Corp., 144 F. Supp. 2d 305, 309 
(D. Del. 2001)). 
 195. Id. at 1338 (quoting CFMT, Inc. v. YieldUp Int’l Corp., 144 F. Supp. 2d 305, 320 
(D. Del. 2001)). 
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enable “the full scope of the claimed invention.”196 But the claims in 
this case recited “no standard of cleaning[;]” they only required 
“cleaning” in the sense of “removing contaminants from the wafer 
surface.”197 Such claims would be enabled if the disclosures allowed 
persons skilled in the art to “achieve any level of contaminant 
removal without undue experimentation.”198 Although the original 
system was in need of improvement, it did successfully remove grease 
marks from semiconductor wafers—an instance of “contaminant 
removal.”199 The court contrasted this patent, which claimed “a 
general system to improve the cleaning process[,]” with a hypothetical 
patent claiming a system to “achieve[] cleanliness up to a specified 
numerical particle-free range[.]”200 In the latter case, enablement 
would require disclosures allowing persons skilled in the art to 
“achieve that range without undue experimentation.”201 
More recently, in Alcon Research Ltd. v. Barr Laboratories, 
Inc.,202 the Federal Circuit considered patents on a method of 
enhancing the stability of prostaglandin compositions, including 
glaucoma medications, by adding polyethoxylated castor oil 
(“PECO”).203 The claims required the single step of adding a 
chemically stabilizing amount of PECO to the prostaglandin 
composition.204 They required only “some increase in chemical 
stability,” not “a particular level of stability or a particular magnitude 
of increase.”205 Although one might have to experiment to 
“optimiz[e]” the stability of a particular prostaglandin composition, 
the court did not treat such experimentation as relevant to the 
claimed invention.206 The court found the claims adequately enabled 
even though the stabilization had no quantifiable boundary.207 
What is troubling about these cases is that the claims seem to 
embrace implicitly open-ended ranges that the disclosures cannot 
 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. at 1338–39. 
 200. Id. at 1338. 
 201. Id. 
 202. 745 F.3d 1180 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
 203. Id. at 1184. 
 204. Id. at 1189. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id.; see also In re Cortright, 165 F.3d 1353, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (because claims 
calling for the use of a composition to “restor[e] hair growth” covered any increase in the 
hair grown on the scalp, the specification was not required to enable one to restore a “full 
head of hair”). 
 207. In re Cortright, 165 F.3d at 1359. 
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fully enable. If the claims in CFMT cover any level of cleaning, then 
they might be expressed in terms of a range of cleaning extending 
from the removal of any contaminants to the removal of all 
contaminants. Similarly, the claims in Alcon might be said to cover 
changes in stability ranging from the most minor improvement to the 
ultimate in prostaglandin permanence. In neither case were the 
disclosures’ working examples so close to an inherent limit as to leave 
little room for improvement. Unless there is some reason for 
distinguishing between explicit and implicit ranges, it is difficult to see 
why the claims in CFMT and Alcon are less objectionable, in terms of 
enablement, than the claims in MagSil or Fisher. 
B. Enablement by a Single Mode 
Although courts have often said that patent claims and patent 
disclosures must be commensurate in scope, a handful of decisions 
indicate that enablement of a single embodiment of the claimed 
invention is all that is required. As just discussed, CFMT, holding that 
a method of removing grease marks adequately enabled a claim 
covering any level of cleaning, suggests a single-mode standard. A 
more explicit instance is the Federal Circuit’s opinion in Spectra-
Physics, Inc. v. Coherent, Inc.208 There the patents described the 
structure of a laser and a method of constructing it.209 An important 
element of the laser was an array of copper cups firmly bonded to a 
ceramic tube.210 The inventors disclosed brazing with TiCuSil (a 
copper/silver/titanium alloy) as the preferred method of attachment, 
but failed to disclose a six-stage braze cycle that they had perfected.211 
The inventors disclosed well-known moly-manganese and pulse-
soldering processes as acceptable alternatives.212 
The court held that failure to disclose the six-stage braze cycle 
amounted to concealment of the inventor’s best mode.213 The 
enablement requirement, on the other hand, had been satisfied by 
disclosure of the moly-manganese and pulse-soldering alternatives.214 
The court described the situation as “one in which the patent 
specifications disclose more than one means for making the claimed 
invention, but do not adequately disclose the best means actually 
 
 208. 827 F.2d 1524 (Fed. Cir. 1987). 
 209. Id. at 1528–29. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. at 1530. 
 212. See id. at 1529–31. 
 213. See id. at 1535–37. 
 214. Id. at 1533. 
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known to the inventors.”215 Where “[e]nablement looks to placing the 
subject matter of the claims generally in the possession of the 
public[,]” the best mode requirement demands disclosure of “specific 
instrumentalities or techniques which are recognized [by the 
applicant] as the best way of carrying out the invention.”216 In 
contrast, “[n]onenablement,” said the court, “is the failure to disclose 
any mode.”217 Here it was “sufficient	.	.	.	with respect to enablement 
that the patents disclose[d] at least one attachment means [that] 
would enable a person of ordinary skill in the art to make and use the 
claimed inventions.”218 The adequacy of one mode of enablement is, 
the court explained, “the logical implication of having a separate best 
mode requirement	.	.	.	which contemplates that the specification can 
enable one to make and use the invention and still not disclose a 
single preferred embodiment.”219 
The only reference the court made to enabling the full scope of 
the claimed invention was to distinguish between predictable and 
unpredictable arts: “If an invention pertains to an art where the 
results are predictable	.	.	.	a broad claim can be enabled by disclosure 
of a single embodiment, and is not invalid for lack of enablement 
simply because it reads on another embodiment of the invention 
which is inadequately disclosed	.	.	.	.”220 A simple explanation for 
Spectra-Physics is that it involved such a predictable art that a person 
of ordinary skill, armed with knowledge of the familiar moly-
manganese and pulse-soldering techniques, as well as the patents’ 
disclosure of TiCuSil brazing in general, could have achieved the 
undisclosed six-stage braze cycle, or any other means of attaching the 
copper cups to the ceramic tube, without undue experimentation.221 
 
 215. Id. at 1532. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Id. at 1534; see also Takeda Pharm. Co. v. Zydus Pharm. USA, Inc., 743 F.3d 1359, 
1369 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“It is well established that the ‘enablement requirement is met if the 
description enables any mode of making and using the invention.’	” (quoting Johns 
Hopkins Univ. v. CellPro, Inc., 152 F.3d 1342, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1998))); Amgen Inc. v. 
Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“[T]he law makes 
clear that the specification need teach only one mode of making and using a claimed 
composition.” (quoting Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 69, 
160 (D. Mass. 2001))); Engel Indus., Inc. v. Lockformer Co., 946 F.2d 1528, 1533 (Fed. Cir. 
1991) (“The enablement requirement is met if the description enables any mode of 
making and using the claimed invention.”). 
 218. Spectra-Physics, 827 F.2d at 1533. 
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 220. Id. at 1533 (citations omitted). 
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But this simple explanation is inconsistent with the court’s general 
statements regarding enablement (“[n]onenablement is the failure to 
disclose any mode”)222 and the facts that were before it. In order to 
successfully employ the moly-manganese process, the defendant had 
been compelled to hire a brazing expert who experimented for nearly 
a year, and who ultimately developed techniques deserving of their 
own patents.223 The field of the invention hardly seems to be one so 
uncomplicated that the disclosure of one mode of making and using 
the invention constitutes de facto enablement of every mode. 
Spectra-Physics would be easier to dismiss as an aberration if it 
were not so emphatic (chiding the district court224 for categorizing the 
failure to disclose an alternative mode as an enablement issue rather 
than as a best mode issue), if it had not been written by Judge Rich (a 
prominent figure in the development of the 1952 Patent Act),225 and if 
its discussion of the rationale for a separate best mode requirement 
did not ring true. If enablement required disclosures providing access 
to every mode of making and using the claimed invention, why would 
the law separately require disclosure of the “best” mode?226 
C. Enablement in the Context of Rapidly Developing Technologies 
The most difficult issues concerning scope of enablement are in 
the context of rapidly developing technologies. Patents confer 
exclusive rights for a limited time—currently, in most cases, until 
twenty years from the filing date of the patent application.227 In some 
fields of technology, a great deal can happen even in so short a span. 
As previously discussed, the goal of the patent system is to promote 
 
imagined, other embodiments can be made without difficulty and their performance 
characteristics predicted by resort to known scientific laws.”). 
 222. See Spectra-Physics, 827 F.2d at 1534. 
 223. See id. at 1531. 
 224. See id. at 1534. 
 225. See Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2243 (2011) (referring to 
Judge Rich as “a principal drafter of the 1952 Act”). 
 226. It might be because the applicant benefits the public not only by disclosing the 
best mode but by identifying it explicitly as the best mode. See Randomex, Inc. v. Scopus 
Corp., 849 F.2d 585, 592 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (Mayer, J., dissenting) (the best mode may be 
inadequately differentiated). Yet the statutory language—“shall set forth the best mode 
contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention”—seems to require that a 
particular mode be disclosed (“set forth”), not merely that it be identified as the best. See 
35 U.S.C. §	112(a) (2012). 
 227. §	154(a)(2). Previously, the basic patent term was seventeen years from the issue 
date. See §	154(c) (the term for patents applied for prior to June 8, 1995 is the greater of 
the twenty-year term allowed by the current statute or the seventeen-year term provided 
by the former statute). 
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the progress of the useful arts.228 Since O’Reilly v. Morse, courts have 
expressed concern that patentees who claim rights embracing future 
advancements will stand in the way of such progress: 
For aught that we now know some future inventor, in the 
onward march of science, may discover a mode of writing or 
printing at a distance by means of the electric or galvanic 
current, without using any part of the process or combination 
set forth in the plaintiff’s specification. His invention may be 
less complicated—less liable to get out of order—less expensive 
in construction, and in its operation. But yet if it is covered by 
this patent the inventor could not use it, nor the public have the 
benefit of it without the permission of this patentee.229 
One tool that courts have used to prevent patentees from 
interfering with future progress has been the requirement that the 
specification enable the full scope of the claim.230 On the other hand, 
if the field of the invention is changing so rapidly that significant 
advancements can be expected during the term of the patent, there is 
the risk that narrowly drafted claims will prove irrelevant and that 
broadly drafted claims will be invalidated for failure to enable the 
newly invented alternatives. The inventor caught in the middle could 
be left with a worthless patent—hardly an adequate incentive to 
promote the progress of the useful arts. As detailed below, courts 
discussing scope enablement have sometimes emphasized one side of 
the dilemma, and sometimes the other. 
The first principle in dealing with fields of changing technologies 
is that enablement is measured from the perspective of the patent’s 
filing date.231 The issue is approached “retrospectively	.	.	.	by looking 
 
 228. See U.S. CONST. art. I, §	8, cl. 8. 
 229. O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 113 (1853); see also Matheson v. 
Campbell, 78 F. 910, 915 (2d Cir. 1897) (describing a patentee who claimed a broad genus 
of chemicals after discovering, by experiment, that a few would achieve the desired results, 
as “propos[ing] to set himself in the pathway of future experimenters	.	.	.	and, as the result 
of each new experiment is disclosed, [firing] away at it, calculating to ‘hit it if it is a deer, 
and miss if it is a cow’	”). 
 230. See supra note 108 and accompanying text. 
 231. “The enablement determination proceeds as of the effective filing date of the 
patent.” MagSil Corp. v. Hitachi Glob. Storage Techs., Inc., 687 F.3d 1377, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 
2012); see also Cephalon, Inc. v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 707 F.3d 1330, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2013) 
(“This requirement is met when at the time of filing the application one skilled in the art, 
having read the specification, could practice the invention without ‘undue 
experimentation.’	”); ALZA Corp. v. Andrx Pharm., LLC, 603 F.3d 935, 940 (Fed. Cir. 
2010) (“Enablement is determined as of the effective filing date of the patent’s 
application.”); Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 363 F.3d 1247, 1254 (Fed. Cir. 2004) 
(“Whether the earlier applications enable the claims	.	.	.	is determined as of the filing date 
of each application.”). 
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back to the filing date of the patent application and determining 
whether undue experimentation would have been required to make 
and use the claimed invention at that time.”232 One consequence is 
that inadequacies in the disclosure that existed at the time of filing 
cannot be remedied by subsequent additions to the knowledge 
available to those skilled in the art.233 If it were otherwise, one could 
not rely on the filing date of the application as the date on which the 
applicant had a completed invention.234 The filing-date perspective 
can also work to the patentee’s advantage if later events render a 
once-enabling disclosure no longer adequate. This could happen, for 
example, if products described in the specification as necessary to 
practice the invention later became unavailable.235 
Some cases suggest that the filing-date perspective on 
enablement protects a patentee from the impossible task of having to 
predict the future. In re Hogan236 is one such case. The claims covered 
a genus of solid polymers, including high-molecular-weight 
amorphous polymers. Because the specification disclosed how to 
make only low-molecular-weight crystalline polymers, the Patent 
Office rejected the claims as not commensurate in scope with the 
enabling disclosure.237 The Court of Custom and Patent Appeals 
reversed. The amorphous polymers referenced by the examiner were 
revealed in a publication subsequent to the filing date of the patent; at 
the time of filing, they did not exist.238 If the application was enabling 
when filed, considering all of the evidence then available, “then the 
fact of that enablement was established for all time and a later change 
in the state of the art [could not] change it.”239 To require the 
 
 232. Elan Pharm., Inc. v. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research, 346 F.3d 1051, 
1056–57 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (quoting Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Calgene, Inc., 188 F.3d 1362, 
1371–72 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). 
 233. In re Glass, 492 F.2d 1228, 1232 (C.C.P.A. 1974). 
 234. “It is an applicant’s obligation to supply enabling disclosure without reliance on 
what others may publish after he has filed an application on what is supposed to be a 
completed invention. If he cannot supply enabling information, he is not yet in a position 
to file.” Id. 
 235. See In re Coleman, 472 F.2d 1062, 1064–65 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (the chance that 
specific materials required to practice the invention would be removed from the market 
was too small to support a rejection for nonenablement); In re Argoudelis, 434 F.2d 1390, 
1393–94 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (dismissing as “speculative” the possibility that a disclosure 
might someday become nonenabling). 
 236. 559 F.2d 595 (C.C.P.A. 1977). 
 237. Id. at 602–04. 
 238. Id. at 604–05. 
 239. Id. at 605. One can use subsequent developments to shed light on the state of 
knowledge at the time the application was filed. See Plant Genetic Sys., N.V. v. DeKalb 
Genetics Corp., 315 F.3d 1335, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2003); In re Koller, 613 F.2d 819, 824 
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applicants to disclose in 1953 a polymer that did not exist until 1962 
would “impose an impossible burden on inventors and thus on the 
patent system.”240 
The court linked its timing rule to broader considerations of 
policy. Rejections based on the scope of enablement raise, it said, 
“the more fundamental question: To what scope of protection is this 
applicant’s particular contribution to the art entitled?”241 If the 
applicants in Hogan were “pioneers”—perhaps the first to introduce 
any form of solid polymer—then they “deserve[d] broad claims to the 
broad concept.”242 “Basic inventions” should result in “basic patents” 
in order to provide the incentives necessary to foster progress in the 
useful arts.243 If later discoveries could be used to invalidate claims, 
“the opportunity for obtaining a basic patent upon early disclosure of 
pioneer inventions would be abolished.”244 To require the applicants 
in this case to confine their polymer claims to the crystalline form, if 
they were in fact pioneers, would be “a poor way to stimulate 
invention, and particularly to encourage its early disclosure.”245 
Limiting inventors to such narrow claims, the court explained, would 
be “merely to state a policy against broad protection for pioneer 
inventions, a policy both shortsighted and unsound from the 
standpoint of promoting progress in the useful arts.”246 
“Basic patents” may leave room for improvement, but such 
improvements, if nonobvious, should be rewarded with their own 
 
(C.C.P.A. 1980); In re Hogan, 559 F.2d at 605. Documents published later might serve as 
evidence that the invention had been enabled as of the filing date. See Amgen Inc. v. 
Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (enablement 
conclusion was “buttressed by numerous post-filing publications that demonstrated the 
extent of the enabling disclosure”). Alternatively, a long period of delay before success 
was achieved by persons skilled in the art might demonstrate that a disclosure was not 
enabling as of its filing date. See Genentech, Inc. v. Novo Nordisk, A/S, 108 F.3d 1361, 
1367 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
 240. In re Hogan, 559 F.2d at 606. 
 241. Id. at 605–06. 
 242. Id. at 606. 
 243. Id.; see also In re Anderson, 471 F.2d 1237, 1240 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (the principle 
requiring that claims be commensurate in scope with the invention “requires as much the 
granting of broad claims on broad inventions as it does the granting of more specific 
claims on more specific inventions” (quoting In re Sus, 306 F.2d 494, 497 (C.C.P.A. 
1962))). 
 244. In re Hogan, 559 F.2d at 606. 
 245. Id.; see also In re Goffe, 542 F.2d 564, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“[T]o provide effective 
incentives, claims must adequately protect inventors. To demand that the first to disclose 
shall limit his claims to what he has found will work	.	.	.	would not serve the constitutional 
purpose of promoting progress in the useful arts.”). 
 246. In re Hogan, 559 F.2d at 606. 
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patents.247 “It is quite another thing,” warned the court in Hogan, “to 
utilize the patenting or publication of later	.	.	.	improvements to ‘reach 
back’ and preclude or invalidate a patent on the underlying 
invention.”248 Were such “reaching back” allowed, the validity of a 
claim would forever be unsettled.249 
Hogan may represent the high-water mark of concern for 
“pioneer” inventors. Later cases adopt Hogan’s filing-date rule, but 
without discussing the need to encourage pioneer inventors with 
broad patent claims. United States Steel Corp. v. Phillips Petroleum 
Co.250 is a case with similar facts. The claims covered polypropylene 
generally, including a high molecular weight crystalline version 
discovered long after the filing date of the application—a version that, 
at the time of filing, “no one thought	.	.	.	possible.”251 The adequacy of 
the disclosure had to be judged in relation to the art as it existed when 
the application was filed.252 Anything else, in the words of Hogan, 
would “impose an impossible burden on inventors and thus on the 
patent system.”253 Later, in Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc.,254 the 
Federal Circuit considered claims to monoclonal antibodies that bind 
to an antigen associated with breast cancer cells.255 Initially, such 
antibodies were derived from mice.256 “Chimeric” versions with 
human content have fewer side effects, but these were not developed 
until after the filing date on which the patentee relied.257 A patent, the 
court observed, “cannot enable technology that arises after the date 
of the application.”258 One cannot “expect an applicant to disclose 
knowledge invented or developed after the filing date” because 
“[s]uch disclosure would be impossible.”259 Citing Hogan, the court 
held that chimeric antibodies, not revealed in the literature until after 
 
 247. Id. 
 248. Id. 
 249. See id. (“An examiner could never safely call a halt and pass an application to 
issue.”). 
 250. 865 F.2d 1247 (Fed. Cir. 1989). 
 251. Id. at 1251–52. 
 252. Id. at 1252. 
 253. Id. (quoting In re Hogan, 559 F.2d at 606). 
 254. 363 F.3d 1247 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 255. Id. at 1250. 
 256. Id. 
 257. See id. at 1250–51. 
 258. Id. at 1254. 
 259. Id. 
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the applicant’s filing date, were “new technology” that was “by 
definition, outside the bounds of the enablement requirement.”260 
While not abrogating the filing-date rule of Hogan, other cases 
treat later-developed technologies as highly relevant to the question 
of whether the scope of a claim is fully enabled. Indeed, it is generally 
in the context of later-arising technologies that the question of scope 
enablement arises at all. In MagSil, the court devoted much of its 
discussion to advances in technology that occurred after the patent’s 
filing date. By 1995, the year the patent application was filed, the 
patentees had achieved changes in resistance of 11.8%.261 Although 
the patentees predicted resistance changes of up to 100%, these levels 
were not achieved until 2006 or 2007, following experiments with 
electrode metals and insulator materials.262 By 2008, researchers had 
achieved resistance changes of 604%—well beyond what the 
inventors had considered the theoretical limit at the time of filing.263 
The court found that the “field of art ha[d] advanced vastly after the 
filing of the claimed invention,” yet the disclosures did not “present 
even a remote possibility that an ordinarily skilled artisan could have 
achieved the modern dimensions of this art.”264 While these later 
developments shed light on what could be achieved (or, more 
accurately, could not be achieved) at the time of filing, it seems 
unlikely that the Hogan court would have found 2008 disk drive 
technology more relevant than the post-filing-date invention of 
amorphous polymers. 
In MagSil, the court did not express concern that requiring 
inventors to anticipate later developments in the art would impose an 
“impossible burden,” nor did the court discuss the need to encourage 
pioneer inventors with broad patent claims.265 On the contrary, the 
court recited the benefits of limited patent claims: 
 
 260. Id. The court did, however, find a problem under the written description 
requirement. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. A patent that introduced the 
chimeric antibody technology as “new matter” could not rely on the filing date of an 
application filed when such technology did not exist. At the time of the original 
application, the patentees could not have demonstrated “possession” of a later-arising 
technology. See Chiron, 363 F.3d at 1255. 
 261. MagSil Corp. v. Hitachi Glob. Storage Techs., Inc., 687 F.3d 1377, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 
2012). 
 262. Id. at 1382. 
 263. Id. at 1382–83. 
 264. Id. at 1382. 
 265. Had the court addressed the discussion of policy in MagSil, it might have 
dismissed it, as the Federal Circuit did on another occasion, as “extended dicta.” Plant 
Genetic Sys., N.V. v. DeKalb Genetics Corp., 315 F.3d 1335, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2003) 
(quoting In re Hogan, 559 F.2d 595, 610 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (Miller, J., concurring in part)). 
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The enablement doctrine’s prevention of over broad claims 
ensures that the patent system preserves necessary incentives 
for follow-on or improvement inventions. In this case, for 
instance, many additional inventions and advances were 
necessary to take this technology from a 20% resistance change 
to the over 600% change in present data storage systems. 
Moreover this technology area will continue to profit from 
inventive contributions. Enablement operates to ensure 
fulsome protection and thus “enable” these upcoming 
advances.266 
Although MagSil stands out for its reliance on post-filing-date 
advancements in the art, many other cases contrast the limited 
teachings of a challenged patent to after-arising technologies. In Enzo 
Biochem, Inc. v. Calgene, Inc.,267 for example, the court found that 
claims to the use of “antisense” technology to block gene expression 
were not adequately enabled because it was only later that antisense 
techniques were successfully applied to eukaryotic organisms like the 
accused FLAVR SAVR tomato.268 In Monsanto Co. v. Syngenta 
Seeds, Inc.,269 claims involving the genetic transformation of plant 
cells were not fully enabled because they were “filed before 
transformation of monocot [plant] cells was possible.”270 In Liebel-
Flarsheim, the practical jacketless injectors that rendered the claims 
nonenabled were invented only after the filing date of the patent.271 
One distinction discussed by the Federal Circuit may explain why 
after-arising technologies are sometimes proper to compare to the 
disclosures of a patent and sometimes “out of bounds.” In Plant 
Genetic Systems, N.V. v. DeKalb Genetics Corp., the court confirmed 
that technologies “not known or in existence when the application 
was filed[,]” like the amorphous propylene at issue in Hogan, need 
not be enabled.272 This forgiveness does not extend, however, to 
 
 266. MagSil, 687 F.3d at 1384. 
 267. 188 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
 268. See id. at 1367–68. The disclosure was limited to the practice of the invention in 
prokaryotic E. coli cells; the patent offered no more than an “	‘invitation’ [to] those of skill 
in the art to experiment practicing antisense in eukaryotic cells.” Id. at 1374. 
 269. 503 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 270. Id. at 1361. 
 271. See Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 481 F.3d 1371, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2007) 
(the district court “found that no prototypes of a jacketless injector had been made or 
described at the time of filing, and that the state of the art was such that a jacketless 
system with a disposable syringe would have been a ‘true innovation’	”). 
 272. Plant Genetic Sys., N.V. v. DeKalb Genetics Corp., 315 F.3d 1335, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 
2003). 
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“what was specifically desired but difficult to obtain.”273 Monocot 
plants were known at the time of filing, and “stably-transformed 
monocot cells were highly desirable.”274 Some might have been 
produced already.275 Consequently, “monocots and stably 
transformed monocot cells were not an unknown concept that came 
into existence only after 1987.”276 This passage suggests that an after-
arising technology might be relevant to enablement if it was already a 
“known concept”—something much sought after if not yet achieved. 
In Chiron, the court used the term “nascent technology” to describe 
fields so new that persons skilled in the art would be particularly 
dependent on the teachings of the patent disclosure.277 Perhaps 
Chiron’s “nascent technology” can be stretched to include 
advancements that are on the horizon or the subject of continuing 
research. This distinction might relieve at least some of the existing 
confusion. 
As it stands, the “state of the art” on patent enablement leaves 
much to be desired. The Wands factors help us decide whether 
particular embodiments are enabled, but they cannot tell us whether 
after-arising technologies are irrelevant or the very reason that an 
enabling disclosure falls short. Why was it enough in CFMT that the 
disclosed system accomplished some cleaning, although much less 
than what would be later achieved, but in MagSil the patentees were 
undone by their failure to enable the “modern dimensions of [the] 
art[?]”278 Can the principle that a specification must enable the “full 
scope” of the claimed invention be reconciled with the reality that 
open-ended patent claims regularly embrace countless improvements, 
often patentable in themselves, that await further technological 
advancements?279 If our goal is to promote the progress of the useful 
arts, how should we balance the need to provide meaningful rewards 
to inventors responsible for breakthroughs in rapidly developing arts 
against the fear that further progress will be hindered by broad 
claims? In the following Part, I propose a framework for addressing 
 
 273. Id. 
 274. Id. 
 275. Id. 
 276. Id. 
 277. Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 363 F.3d 1247, 1254 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 278. MagSil Corp. v. Hitachi Glob. Storage Techs., Inc., 687 F.3d 1377, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 
2012). 
 279. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 670 F.3d 1206, 1218 (Fed. Cir. 2012) 
(“[A] separately patented invention may indeed be within the scope of the claims of a 
dominating patent.”); JVW Enters., Inc. v. Interact Accessories, Inc., 424 F.3d 1324, 1333 
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (added features and improvements do not avoid infringement). 
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nonenabled embodiments that would account for many of the 
distinctions and apparent contradictions found in existing case law, 
while attempting to provide appropriate incentives for advancements 
in rapidly developing fields. 
III.  A FRAMEWORK FOR ADDRESSING EMBODIMENTS OF THE 
CLAIMED INVENTION THAT FILING-DATE TECHNOLOGY DID NOT 
ENABLE 
The rule I propose, in a nutshell, is this: 
If a claim includes embodiments that the specification does not 
enable, the claim is invalid unless an applicant could not 
reasonably have been expected to seek a claim that would have 
excluded them. 
The exception applies where: 
(1) The nonenabled embodiments were unforeseeable; 
(2) The nonenabled aspects of those embodiments are 
tangential to the patentee’s contribution to the art; or 
(3) For some other reason, an applicant could not reasonably 
have drafted a claim more narrowly tailored to the enabled 
embodiments. 
Readers familiar with patent law will recognize that the model 
for this rule comes from an unlikely source—the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.280 
It is an unlikely source because the Festo decision deals not with 
enablement but with prosecution history estoppel. Before discussing 
the proposed enablement rule in detail, it is worth considering what 
the Supreme Court did in Festo and why it may not be farfetched to 
pursue a similar approach in what is otherwise a very different area of 
patent law. 
As previously discussed, the claims of a patent define the 
exclusive rights of the patent owner.281 If all of the elements set forth 
in a claim are present in the accused product, that product literally 
infringes the claim.282 Even if the accused product is not precisely 
what the claims require, the judicially developed doctrine of 
 
 280. 535 U.S. 722 (2002). 
 281. See supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
 282. See TechSearch, L.L.C. v. Intel Corp., 286 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“To 
establish literal infringement, all of the elements of the claim, as correctly construed, must 
be present in the accused system.”). 
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equivalents allows infringement to be found where the differences are 
insubstantial.283 One of the most important limitations on 
infringement by equivalence is the principle of prosecution history 
estoppel. Prosecution history estoppel bars a patentee from claiming 
as an equivalent any subject matter given up in order to secure the 
issuance of the patent.284 For example, if a mousetrap inventor added 
a “two springs” limitation to a patent claim in order to avoid prior art 
with one spring, the inventor could not later argue that one spring and 
two springs are equivalent. 
In Festo, the majority of the Federal Circuit endorsed a bright-
line rule for prosecution history estoppel: a patentee who amended a 
claim element during prosecution for any reason relating to 
patentability is completely barred from asserting the doctrine of 
equivalents with respect to that element.285 On appeal, the Supreme 
Court reversed. The reason for the doctrine of equivalents, the Court 
explained, is that “the nature of language makes it impossible to 
capture the essence of a thing in a patent application.”286 Because 
“[t]hings are not made for the sake of words, but words for things,”287 
the language of a patent claim “may not capture every nuance of the 
invention or describe with complete precision the range of its 
novelty.”288 This may leave “unintended idea gaps”289—gaps that 
opportunists, if not for the doctrine of equivalents, could exploit. 
Even after amendment, “language remains an imperfect fit for 
invention.”290 The Court therefore found “no more reason for holding 
the patentee to the literal terms of an amended claim than [for] 
abolishing the doctrine of equivalents altogether.”291 
The Supreme Court held that prosecution history estoppel must 
be applied in a flexible manner, bearing in mind what it was that an 
 
 283. See Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950) 
(the doctrine of equivalents reaches “insubstantial changes and substitutions	.	.	.	which, 
though adding nothing, would be enough to take the copied matter outside the claim, and 
hence outside the reach of law”). 
 284. Honeywell Int’l, Inc. v. Hamilton Sundstrand Corp., 523 F.3d 1304, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 
2008). 
 285. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 574 (Fed. 
Cir. 2000) (en banc). 
 286. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 731 (2002). 
 287. Id. (quoting Autogiro Co. of Am. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 397 (Ct. Cl. 
1967)). 
 288. Id. 
 289. Id. (quoting Autogiro Co. of Am. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 397 (Ct. Cl. 
1967)). 
 290. Id. at 738. 
 291. Id. 
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applicant who narrowed a claim deliberately gave up.292 An applicant 
who narrows a claim is presumed to have surrendered anything 
excluded by the amendment.293 But the patentee can overcome the 
presumption by showing that “at the time of the amendment one 
skilled in the art could not reasonably be expected to have drafted a 
claim that would have literally encompassed the alleged 
equivalent.”294 Specifically, a narrowing amendment does not 
surrender an equivalent if (1) the equivalent was unforeseeable; (2) 
“the rationale underlying the amendment [bore] no more than a 
tangential relation to the equivalent in question;” or (3) there is 
“some other reason” why the patentee could not have included the 
equivalent within the literal scope of the claim.295 As to the details of 
the third, catchall category, the Court did not elaborate, but it may 
have had in mind those persistent “idea gaps” that make it difficult to 
capture the essence of an invention in language. 
In some respects, prosecution history estoppel and scope 
enablement are opposite sides of the same coin. In the first instance, 
an applicant may, without intending to, exclude from the claims 
embodiments that are within the scope of the applicant’s contribution 
to the art. In the second instance, an applicant may, without intending 
to, include within the scope of the claims embodiments that are 
beyond the scope of the applicant’s contribution to the art. The 
Court’s approach in Festo shows a desire to treat patent applicants 
fairly and to ensure that their rights are not undermined because of 
circumstances they cannot control. The same concerns should 
animate the rules of enablement. Although Festo certainly does not 
require a parallel approach, it is unsurprising, ultimately, that 
concepts introduced by the Court in the context of prosecution 
history estoppel could be usefully applied in the context of 
enablement. 
A. Unforeseeable Embodiments 
Courts often speak of a “reasonable” correlation between the 
scope of a patent claim and the scope of an enabling disclosure.296 
 
 292. Id. at 739–40. 
 293. Id. at 740 (“A patentee’s decision to narrow his claims through amendment may 
be presumed to be a general disclaimer of the territory between the original claim and the 
amended claim.”). 
 294. Id. at 741. 
 295. Id. at 740–41. 
 296. See, e.g., Auto. Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 501 F.3d 1274, 1285 
(Fed. Cir. 2007) (“[T]here ‘must be “reasonable enablement of the scope of the 
range”	.	.	.	.’	” (quoting Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 481 F.3d 1371, 1380 (Fed. 
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When using the Wands factors, courts ask what one could reasonably 
expect from a person of ordinary skill in the art.297 In the context of 
unforeseeable embodiments, they should ask what one can 
reasonably expect from an applicant. If, as Festo suggests, one should 
not deny the doctrine of equivalents to applicants who lack the gift of 
prophecy with respect to future embodiments, it is equally clear that 
one should not invalidate claims for the same failing. One can only 
expect an applicant to do what is reasonable.298 
Courts have assured us that patent applicants are “not 
required	.	.	.	to predict every possible variation, improvement, or 
commercial embodiment of [the] invention.”299 The most 
unpredictable embodiments within the scope of a patent claim are 
those that come into being because of technological breakthroughs 
that a reasonable applicant would not have expected to occur. For 
example, in United States Steel, at the time the patent application was 
filed, “no one thought it possible” that propylene could be made with 
the high molecular weights later achieved.300 The amorphous 
polymers of Hogan may fall in the same category.301 An applicant who 
broadly claims a composition may reasonably believe at the time that 
the species disclosed in the specification adequately represent the 
entirety of the genus. To expect an applicant to predict breakthrough 
 
Cir. 2007))); In re Fisher, 427 F.2d 833, 839 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (“[T]he scope of the claims 
must bear a reasonable correlation to the scope of enablement provided by the 
specification to persons of ordinary skill in the art.”). 
 297. See Alcon Research Ltd. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 745 F.3d 1180, 1188 (Fed. Cir. 2014) 
(experimentation is not “undue” if “such that an ordinarily skilled artisan would 
reasonably be expected to carry it out”); Cephalon, Inc. v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 707 F.3d 
1330, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (enablement is not precluded if a person of ordinary skill in the 
art would have to engage in “a reasonable amount of routine experimentation”); ALZA 
Corp. v. Andrx Pharm., LLC, 603 F.3d 935, 940 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“Enablement is not 
precluded where a ‘reasonable’ amount of routine experimentation is required to practice 
a claimed invention, however, such experimentation must not be ‘undue.’	”). 
 298. If enablement standards reflected only the interests of the public—ignoring the 
limitations of a reasonable applicant—one might require that claims remain enabled after 
the patent filing date. That this is not the case, see supra notes 235–40 and accompanying 
text, which indicate that courts do not wish to impose, in the name of enablement, 
unreasonable burdens on patent applicants. 
 299. U.S. Steel Corp. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 865 F.2d 1247, 1250 (Fed. Cir. 1989) 
(quoting Phillips Petroleum Co. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 673 F. Supp. 1278, 1292 (D. Del. 
1987)); see also Epistar Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 566 F.3d 1321, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2009) 
(“[A]n applicant is not required to describe in the specification every conceivable and 
possible future embodiment of his invention.” (quoting Cordis Corp. v. Medtronic AVE 
Inc., 339 F.3d 1352, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2003))); Invitrogen Corp. v. Clontech Labs., Inc., 429 
F.3d 1052, 1071 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“Enablement does not require the inventor to foresee 
every means of implementing an invention at pains of losing his patent franchise.”). 
 300. U.S. Steel, 865 F.2d at 1252. 
 301. See In re Hogan, 559 F.2d 595, 606 (C.C.P.A. 1977). 
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inventions that undermine that belief is to impose not only an 
unreasonable burden on patentees but an “impossible” one.302 
Similarly, an applicant who claims a range may reasonably 
believe that physical limits prevent the scope of the claim from greatly 
exceeding the scope of the disclosure—as an applicant claiming a 
pure composition expects 100% purity to be the most one could 
achieve.303 To some extent, MagSil suggests that situation. At the time 
the patent application was filed the inventors apparently believed that 
resistance changes of 100% were the theoretical limit.304 Later 
developments that produced resistance changes of more than 600% 
proved that understanding to have been wrong, but it may have been 
reasonable at the time. If the inventors had disclosed how to achieve 
something close to a 100% change in resistance, rather than the 
11.8% they actually disclosed, then the inventors could reasonably 
have argued that the later developments should be discounted as 
unforeseeable. 
On the other hand, just because an embodiment within the scope 
of a claim was invented after the filing date does not mean that it was 
unforeseeable. Often patentees can anticipate, and avoid by a 
narrower claim, embodiments that depend on subsequent advances in 
the art. In Hogan, for example, the issue should not have been 
whether amorphous polymers “existed” as of the filing date,305 but 
whether their invention could reasonably have been expected. If so, 
they might easily have been excluded from the patentee’s claims. The 
same is true of the chimeric antibodies discussed in Chiron. Even if 
their successful fabrication depended on after-arising technology, 
they might have been a foreseeable development. The Chiron court 
states that “[b]ecause the first publication documenting the successful 
creation of chimeric antibodies occurred after the filing [date,]” the 
chronology “shows that this new technology arose after the filing date 
and thus was, by definition, outside the bounds of the enablement 
requirement.”306 But it is possible that the applicants would have 
known, as of the filing date, that chimeric antibodies were on the 
 
 302. Id. 
 303. See supra note 262 and accompanying text. 
 304. See MagSil Corp. v. Hitachi Glob. Storage Techs., Inc., 687 F.3d 1377, 1382 (Fed. 
Cir. 2012). 
 305. See In re Hogan, 559 F.2d at 606 (“To now say that appellants should have 
disclosed in 1953 the amorphous form which	.	.	.	did not exist until 1962, would be to 
impose an impossible burden on inventors and thus on the patent system.”). To anticipate 
a variant that was foreseen, even if it did not yet exist, would not be an “impossible 
burden.” 
 306. Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 363 F.3d 1247, 1254 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
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horizon and to be expected during the term of the patent.307 In Plant 
Genetic Systems, the court states that monocot plants existed in 1987 
and that stably transformed monocots were “highly desirable.”308 
Stable monocots were not, therefore, “an unknown concept that came 
into existence only after 1987.”309 Although the court did not use the 
word “foreseeable,” a foreseeability test for enablement would 
explain why the court thought these distinctions important. 
Demonstrating that an after-arising variant was or was not 
foreseeable would depend on the unique facts of each case. A number 
of factors previously discussed by the Federal Circuit could 
demonstrate that a nonenabled embodiment was foreseeable. As with 
the Wands factors, the following list should be regarded as 
representative rather than exclusive.310 
1.  Claims Broadened to Include a Nonenabled Embodiment 
One salient fact is whether the applicant began with claims that 
would have excluded the nonenabled embodiment, only to expand 
them later. This is what occurred in Liebel-Flarsheim, where the 
applicant removed pressure jacket limitations in the original claims in 
order to secure broader claims reading on a competitor’s device.311 In 
the context of prosecution history estoppel, the Supreme Court said 
in Festo that an applicant who narrowed original claims that once 
embraced an equivalent “cannot assert that he lacked the words to 
describe the subject matter in question.”312 On the contrary, the 
 
 307. After dismissing as speculative the “hypothetical possibility” that the applicants 
could have learned about chimeric antibodies through a prepublication leak, the court 
treated the possibility as, in any event, irrelevant, because “the enablement requirement 
does not extend to technology that arises after the time of filing.” Id. at 1254–55. 
 308. Plant Genetic Sys., N.V. v. DeKalb Genetics Corp, 315 F.3d 1335, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 
2003). 
 309. Id. 
 310. See supra note 43 and accompanying text. Courts determine basic enablement 
from the perspective of the patent application’s filing date. Information that came to light 
after that date can neither help nor hurt the patentee. See supra notes 231–32 and 
accompanying text. Addressing the foreseeability of nonenabled embodiments requires a 
broader perspective. One should ask whether, at any time before the patent issued, the 
applicant could reasonably have foreseen and—by substituting a narrower claim—avoided 
including nonenabled embodiments within the scope of the patent. This would provide the 
right temporal perspective for considering claims that were broadened during prosecution. 
It would also account for situations where, before a patent issued, it became clear that 
natural limitations on the scope of the invention actually could be exceeded, or new 
species (like amorphous polymers) unexpectedly appeared within the range of a genus. 
 311. Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 481 F.3d 1371, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2007); see 
also AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac, 344 F.3d 1234, 1237 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (the inventors obtained 
broader claims that included aluminum alloys). 
 312. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 734 (2002). 
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amendment of the original claims “establishe[s] that the inventor 
turned his attention to the subject matter in question, knew the words 
for both the broader and narrower claim, and affirmatively chose the 
latter.”313 Similarly, the inventors in Liebel-Flarsheim were not taken 
off-guard by the possibility of a jacketless injector, as they might have 
been had their original claims omitted any reference to the presence 
or absence of a pressure jacket. They knew precisely what they were 
doing when they broadened the claims. Moreover, perhaps because 
they were aware of the enablement problems to come, they retained 
references to a pressure jacket in some of their narrower claims.314 
Consequently, invalidating the broader claims does not put the 
inventors to the “impossible burden” of predicting the future, nor 
does it strip them of all of their exclusive rights. Instead, they are left 
with claims that more closely parallel their disclosures. 
2.  References to the Nonenabled Embodiment in the Specification 
Another factor to consider is whether the specification itself 
demonstrates that the applicant was aware of a nonenabled 
alternative. In some cases, the evidence may be in the form of a 
specification that “teaches away” from the alternative. AK Steel is the 
best example of this. The specification “clearly and strongly 
warn[ed]” that Type 1 aluminum should be avoided because it would 
not adhere well to the steel substrate.315 This shows that the applicants 
knew, when they expanded their claims, that they were embracing an 
embodiment excluded by their teachings. Liebel-Flarsheim is similar; 
there the applicants warned in their specification that jacketless 
injectors would be impractical.316 In AK Steel, the court calls such 
teachings “[w]orse than being silent.”317 They are worse in the sense 
that they do not assist persons skilled in the art in the successful 
practice of the alternative; they are worse also in the sense that they 
show the applicant to have been fully aware of the alternative—
deliberately excluding it from the original claims, and deliberately 
including it in the later ones. 
 
 313. Id. at 735. 
 314. See U.S. Patent No. 5,456,669 col. 18 ll. 16–17 (filed Nov. 30, 1993) (referring to a 
“tubular pressure jacket”). 
 315. AK Steel, 344 F.3d at 1244. 
 316. Liebel-Flarsheim, 481 F.3d at 1379 (the specification “teaches away” from a 
jacketless injector, warning that disposable syringes for a system without pressure jackets 
would be “expensive and therefore impractical” (quoting ‘669 Patent col. 1 ll. 23–31)). 
 317. AK Steel, 344 F.3d at 1244. 
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A specification can demonstrate awareness of a nonenabled 
embodiment without also “teaching away” from it. In Automotive 
Technologies, the applicants said nothing to discourage the use of an 
electronic air bag sensor. On the contrary, they encouraged electronic 
sensors in a general way by including a “conceptional view” of such a 
sensor and by discussing the host of technologies that might be 
usefully applied in that application.318 Although the teachings were 
“vague,” they show that the applicants foresaw the use of electronic 
alternatives to a mechanical sensor.319 They simply did not disclose 
enough about those alternatives to allow them to be practiced without 
undue experimentation.320 The court stressed the contrast between 
the elaborate description of the mechanical sensor and the cursory 
description of the electronic one.321 This contrast in itself shows that 
the applicants might have anticipated the enablement difficulties 
posed by electronic sensors. 
One of the Wands factors used to determine whether an 
embodiment of the claimed invention could be practiced without 
undue experimentation is “the amount of direction or guidance” to be 
found in the patent specification.322 In that context, more guidance is 
clearly better than less. When considering whether a nonenabled 
embodiment was foreseeable to the applicant, the reverse may be 
true. A certain amount of positive guidance is “worse than being 
silent[,]”323 if it demonstrates the applicant’s awareness of an 
alternative without being enough to enable it. It may seem perverse 
to, in a sense, punish an applicant for saying too much.324 Yet, had the 
 
 318. Auto. Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 501 F.3d 1274, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 
2007) (quoting U.S. Patent No. 5,231,253 col. 10 ll. 3–11 (filed June 2, 1992)). 
 319. Id. at 1278–80. 
 320. Id. at 1284 (“[T]he specification provides ‘only a starting point, a direction for 
further research’	.	.	.	.” (quoting Genentech, Inc. v. Novo Nordisk, A/S, 108 F.3d 1361, 1366 
(Fed. Cir. 1997))); see also ALZA Corp. v. Andrx Pharm., LLC, 603 F.3d 935, 940 (Fed. 
Cir. 2010) (the specification referenced nonosmotic dosage forms but did not provide 
enough disclosure to allow them to be practiced without undue experimentation). 
 321. See Auto. Techs., 501 F.3d at 1284. 
 322. In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988); see also Cephalon, Inc. v. Watson 
Pharm., Inc., 707 F.3d 1330, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (quoting In re Wands, 858 F.2d at 737); 
Streck, Inc. v. Research & Diagnostic Sys., Inc., 665 F.3d 1269, 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2012) 
(same). 
 323. AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac, 344 F.3d 1234, 1244 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 324. It may seem perverse because patent law should encourage disclosures. 
Disclosures are a part of the patentee’s “bargain.” See supra note 17 and accompanying 
text. However, there are other instances in which saying too much in the specification can 
disadvantage the patentee. For example, a patentee who discloses an alternative, but does 
not claim it, may be found to have dedicated the alternative to the public. See Johnson & 
Johnston Assocs. Inc. v. R.E. Serv. Co., 285 F.3d 1046, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (en banc). 
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specification in Automotive Technologies said nothing about 
electronic sensors, it would have been easier to conclude that they 
were an unanticipated development and one that the applicants could 
not have been expected to avoid by drafting narrower claims. 
Similarly, “teaching away” may have unique implications when 
the question is whether a nonenabled embodiment was foreseeable. If 
the claims in Liebel-Flarsheim had never mentioned a pressure jacket, 
one might conclude from the warnings in the specification that the 
applicants did not foresee jacketless injectors as a viable option. In 
such cases, “teaching away” from the nonenabled embodiment may 
be, from the patentee’s perspective, better than being silent. It is only 
because the negative teachings in Liebel-Flarsheim were accompanied 
by expanded claims that those teachings reinforce the conclusion that 
nonenablement was foreseeable.325 
A patentee facing allegations of nonenablement would have to 
decide whether to emphasize what the patent does teach, in hopes of 
showing that it teaches enough to allow the embodiments in question 
to be practiced, or what it does not teach, in hopes of showing that the 
nonenabled embodiments were unforeseeable. Parties challenging a 
patent would face a similar choice.326 This is simply because the most 
problematic embodiments, from an enablement perspective, are those 
occupying a middle ground—too remote from a working example to 
be easily extrapolated, but not so remote as to be entirely unexpected. 
3.  Failed Attempts to Practice the Nonenabled Embodiment 
A number of cases refer to failures by the patentee to reduce to 
practice the nonenabled embodiment. In Liebel-Flarsheim, the 
inventors experimented with jacketless injector designs before 
 
 325. Because the claims issued in AK Steel explicitly cover aluminum alloys, it would 
have been difficult to argue, even if those were the original claims, that the use of 
something other than pure aluminum was unforeseen. On the other hand, if the original 
claims had simply included open-ended references to aluminum (which would have 
allowed, but not required, other materials to be added), then a specification that taught 
against an alloy might have led one to conclude that workable alloys were an unexpected 
advancement. 
 326. Patentees, and their opponents, face similar dilemmas now. For example, if a 
specification mentions an alternative to the preferred embodiment, the patentee may use 
it to justify an expansive claim interpretation. See Ronald A. Katz, Tech. Licensing LP v. 
Am. Airlines, Inc. (In re Katz Interactive Call Processing Patent Litig.), 639 F.3d 1303, 
1324 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[T]here is a strong presumption against a claim construction that 
excludes a disclosed embodiment	.	.	.	.”). But if that effort fails, the same reference to an 
alternative may restrict the patentee’s ability to employ the doctrine of equivalents. See 
Johnson & Johnston, 285 F.3d at 1054. 
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abandoning the effort as “too risky.”327 In AK Steel, the inventors’ 
own experiments taught them that “their invention did not work well 
unless the aluminum [was] substantially pure[.]”328 In Enzo, the 
inventors could not successfully employ their antisense technology to 
control the expression of genes in eukaryotic organisms or any 
prokaryotic organism other than E. coli.329 Such failures are important 
to a straightforward application of the Wands factors because 
patentees are usually highly skilled in the art,330 and they have the 
benefit of the technology taught in their own patents. If they cannot 
successfully practice an alternative embodiment, then it is highly 
unlikely that persons of ordinary skill in the art could do better, at 
least without undue experimentation. Failures are also relevant to 
foreseeability. In the right case, they can show that an applicant was 
well aware that the claims embraced embodiments that the 
specification did not enable. However, this is another instance where 
the evidence might cut the other way. Failed experiments—whether 
those of the applicant or of others whose work was known in the art—
might lead an applicant to conclude that an alternative was 
impracticable. In Liebel-Flarsheim, for example, failures by the 
inventors to implement jacketless injectors might have led them to 
conclude that such injectors were not feasible.331 In MagSil, the 
applicants’ failure to achieve resistance changes of more than 11.8% 
might have led them to conclude that they were approaching a 
theoretical limit. Although other factors may have been more 
important in Liebel-Flarsheim and MagSil, it is easy to see how, under 
the right circumstances, failed experiments might disadvantage the 
patentee who tries to show that an alternative was enabled but might 
help the patentee who relies on unforeseeability instead. 
4.  Progress in the Art Toward the Nonenabled Embodiment 
Another factor relevant to foreseeability is the patentee’s own 
progress, or progress in the art generally, toward practicing an 
alternative embodiment. Progress is a factor that, up to a point, works 
to the advantage of the patentee when one is applying the Wands 
 
 327. Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 481 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 328. AK Steel, 344 F.3d at 1236. 
 329. Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Calgene, Inc., 188 F.3d 1362, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
 330. Inventors are usually treated as persons of extraordinary skill. See Life Techs., Inc. 
v. Clontech Labs., Inc., 224 F.3d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
 331. The district court in Liebel-Flarsheim found that at the time of filing “a jacketless 
system with a disposable syringe would have been a ‘true innovation.’	” Liebel-Flarsheim, 
481 F.3d at 1375 (quoting Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., No. 1:01-CV-98-858, 2005 
WL 2840744, at *14 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 28, 2005)). 
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factors in the traditional manner. If the art has almost achieved an 
alternative embodiment, then it may be plausible to argue that, with 
the help of the patent disclosures, the alternative will be achieved 
without further undue experimentation. On the other hand, if the 
specification falls short of that standard, then the progress that has 
already been made, or the mere fact that research is ongoing, will 
make it difficult to argue that an alternative embodiment was 
unforeseeable. In Plant Genetic Systems, the court identified 
genetically transformed monocot plants as, at the time of filing, a 
“highly desirable” commodity.332 That dicots had already been 
transformed likely marked progress toward the genetic 
transformation of all plant species. In Enzo, success with E. coli 
probably led to the expectation that antisense technology would 
eventually be used to control gene expression in all types of 
organisms. These yet-unattained goals were not, in the words of Plant 
Genetic Systems, “unknown concept[s].”333 Unless an applicant 
believed that there were insurmountable barriers to further progress, 
these circumstances would establish that the nonenabled alternative 
was foreseeable. 
5.  Categorical Distinctions Between the Enabled and Nonenabled 
Embodiments 
Enablement cases often involve obvious categorical distinctions 
between the enabled and nonenabled embodiments. To botanists, the 
distinction between monocot and dicot plants is a fundamental 
taxonomic division.334 To biologists, prokaryotic and eukaryotic 
organisms mark a similar divide.335 Mechanical and electronic sensors 
require very different technologies,336 as do video games and 
movies.337 These kind of coarse-grained distinctions are important 
when deciding if the teachings of the specification with respect to one 
embodiment can be extrapolated to enable another.338 A basic 
 
 332. Plant Genetic Sys., N.V. v. DeKalb Genetics Corp., 315 F.3d 1335, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 
2003). 
 333. Id. 
 334. See id. at 1338 (explaining the difference between monocots and dicots); In re 
Goodman, 11 F.3d 1046, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (the specification enabled the claimed 
invention in dicots but not in monocots). 
 335. See Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Calgene, Inc., 188 F.3d 1362, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 1999) 
(concluding that the patents in question were “extraordinarily broad” for including both 
prokaryotes and eukaryotes). 
 336. See Auto. Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 501 F.3d 1274, 1285 (Fed. Cir. 
2007). 
 337. See Sitrick v. Dreamworks, LLC, 516 F.3d 993, 1000 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 338. See supra Section II.A. 
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taxonomic distinction suggests that a nonenabled embodiment is not 
“just another species” of the same genus but a “distinctly different” 
thing.339 These same distinctions affect foreseeability. An applicant in 
the botanical arts, for example, would understand that teachings 
applicable to dicot plants are not easily translated to monocot plants. 
Hence the enablement problems that arise in such circumstances are 
often foreseeable. 
6.  Result-Oriented Claiming 
Some applicants claim their invention in terms of results 
achieved rather than a specific means to achieve them. Samuel Morse, 
for example, claimed all means for using electromagnetism to 
transmit characters at a distance, rather than just the particular 
telegraph mechanism that he had devised.340 In In re Wright,341 the 
applicant claimed vaccines sharing the antigenic properties of viruses 
that trigger an immune response but not the pathogenic properties 
that cause a disease.342 The patent described the genetic engineering 
techniques required to achieve this desirable result only in general 
terms, and it disclosed just one working example—a vaccine to treat a 
disease known as Prague Avian Sarcoma Virus.343 In AK Steel, the 
claims that were broadened to include aluminum alloys still retained 
the proviso that the “coating layer [is] tightly adherent to the [steel] 
strip and resistant to crazing or flaking during bending.”344 The 
specification did not disclose how to achieve that result except 
through the use of essentially pure Type 2 aluminum.345 The Federal 
Circuit once analogized result-oriented claiming to an inventor who 
creates and discloses a specific fuel-efficient engine, only to claim 
 
 339. Auto. Techs., 501 F.3d at 1285. 
 340. O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 112 (1853). Section 112(f) of the Patent 
Act allows a claim element to be expressed as a means to perform a function. 35 U.S.C. 
§	112(f) (2012). A means-plus-function element covers a structure that performs the 
function recited in the claim if it is identical or equivalent to the corresponding structure 
disclosed in the specification. See Hearing Components, Inc. v. Shure Inc., 600 F.3d 1357, 
1370 (Fed. Cir. 2010). This rule, however, only applies to elements in a claim consisting of 
a combination of elements. Applicants cannot obtain a “single means claim” that simply 
refers to any means of accomplishing a function. See In re Hyatt, 708 F.2d 712, 714 (Fed. 
Cir. 1983) (a single means claim “covers every conceivable means for achieving the stated 
result” and should be rejected on the ground that the enabling disclosure is not 
commensurate in scope with the claim). 
 341. 999 F.2d 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
 342. Id. at 1559. 
 343. See id. at 1558–59. 
 344. AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac, 344 F.3d 1234, 1237 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (quoting U.S. 
Patent No. 5,066,549 col. 7 ll. 6–7 (filed Nov. 22, 1988)). 
 345. Id. at 1244. 
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“every possible type of fuel-efficient engine, no matter how different 
in structure or operation from the inventor’s engine.”346 Although it 
may be permissible to define a claim element in terms of “	‘what it 
does’ rather than ‘what it is,’	”347 applicants who choose “broad 
functional language”348 do so at their peril.349 Often there will be 
means of achieving a claimed result other than those enabled by the 
specification. Hence, an applicant’s choice to employ result-oriented 
language may be considered some evidence that nonenabled 
embodiments were foreseeable. 
In short, a variety of factors, analogous to the Wands factors, 
might be used to determine whether a reasonable applicant could 
have foreseen the hazards of nonenabled embodiments. Where the 
claims were broadened to include them, or where the specification 
discussed them, one can conclude that the applicant was aware of the 
nonenabled embodiments. Where progress in the art marked them as 
an expected development, one can conclude that the applicant should 
have been aware of the nonenabled embodiments. Finally, where the 
applicant drafted claims that ignored obvious taxonomic distinctions, 
or where the applicant chose broad functional language, one can 
conclude that the applicant neglected an opportunity to draft claims 
that would have avoided the nonenabled embodiments. 
B. Tangential Embodiments 
Festo provides an additional exception to prosecution history 
estoppel in cases where an equivalent might have been foreseeable 
when a claim was amended but “the rationale underlying the 
amendment [bore] no more than a tangential relation to the 
equivalent in question.”350 For example, an applicant who added a 
“two springs” limitation to a mousetrap claim in order to avoid prior 
art with a single spring might argue successfully that a three-spring 
mousetrap is still an equivalent.351 The rationale for the amendment 
 
 346. LizardTech, Inc. v. Earth Res. Mapping, Inc., 424 F.3d 1336, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 347. In re Fuetterer, 319 F.2d 259, 264 (C.C.P.A. 1962); see also Gen. Elec. Co. v. 
Wabash Appliance Corp., 304 U.S. 364, 371 (1938) (“A limited use of terms of effect or 
result, which accurately define the essential qualities of a product to one skilled in the art, 
may in some instances be permissible and even desirable	.	.	.	.”). 
 348. Monsanto Co. v. Syngenta Seeds, Inc., 503 F.3d 1352, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 349. See MagSil Corp. v. Hitachi Glob. Storage Techs., Inc., 687 F.3d 1377, 1381 (Fed. 
Cir. 2012) (“[A] patentee chooses broad claim language at the peril of losing any claim 
that cannot be enabled across its full scope of coverage.”). 
 350. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 740 (2002). 
 351. See ALAN L. DURHAM, PATENT LAW ESSENTIALS: A CONCISE GUIDE 198 (4th 
ed. 2013). 
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could have been that only multiple springs can provide the benefits 
attributed to the inventor’s mousetrap. That rationale would be 
highly relevant to whether a one-spring trap is equivalent to the 
claimed invention but tangential (if not entirely irrelevant) to whether 
a three-spring trap is equivalent. In the context of enablement, there 
is no explicit “rationale” to consider. Problems often arise by 
omission—an applicant who could have settled for a narrower claim 
failing to limit it so. Hence the parallel to Festo is weaker here. 
Nevertheless, there is a counterpart in enablement to Festo’s 
“tangential” exception that is equally important. There are occasions 
where even foreseeable nonenabled embodiments within the scope of 
the claim are, in a real sense, beside the point. 
As previously discussed, a typical open-ended patent claim 
embraces countless variants that cannot be made or used without 
undue experimentation.352 The simplest mousetrap claim could be 
infringed by traps made from exotic materials or embellished with 
advanced technologies. A specification could not enable them all 
even if supplemented with knowledge available in the art and the 
potential for routine experimentation. The shortfall is not just 
foreseeable; it is inevitable. The only way to avoid it would be to insist 
on patent claims limited to the preferred embodiments and variants 
of those embodiments that are easily achieved. Such narrow rights 
“would rapidly become worthless as new modes of practicing the 
invention developed, and the inventor would lose the benefit of the 
patent bargain.”353 
What is needed is a way to distinguish between the nonenabled 
embodiments that are merely a consequence of the open-ended 
nature of patent claims and those that demonstrate overreaching by 
the patent applicant. The best approach is to consider the relationship 
between the nonenabled embodiments and the applicant’s 
contribution to the art. In some cases the aspects of the nonenabled 
embodiments that make them nonenabled are, in Festo’s terminology, 
“tangential” to the applicant’s contribution. 
In In re Rassmussen,354 the court considered an application for a 
laminate made by winding a plastic film multiple times around a pair 
of spaced drums.355 The claim language originally called for the use of 
adhesives, as taught in the specification.356 When a claim was 
 
 352. See supra Section II.A.3. 
 353. Invitrogen Corp. v. Clontech Labs., Inc., 429 F.3d 1052, 1071 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 354. 650 F.2d 1212 (C.C.P.A. 1981). 
 355. Id. at 1213. 
 356. Id. 
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expanded to include any method of “adheringly applying” additional 
layers, the examiner rejected it as no longer supported by the 
specification.357 On appeal, the court observed that “the 
specification	.	.	.describe[d] one method of ‘adheringly applying’ one 
layer to the other” and that it was “of no moment” that the claim was 
broader than the embodiment taught in the specification.358 One 
could attribute this, in part, to the predictability of the art; perhaps a 
person skilled in the art could practice any method of adhering the 
layers without having to resort to undue experimentation. But there 
might be more to it than that, as suggested by the court’s reference to 
a hypothetical patent claiming a “scales of justice” where the 
specification only discloses a one-pound lead counterweight.359 
“[B]roader claim language would be permitted[,]” said the court, 
“because the description of the use and function of the lead 
weight	.	.	.	would immediately convey to any person skilled in the 
scale art the knowledge that the applicant invented a scale with a 
[one]-pound counterbalance weight, regardless of its composition.”360 
In this case, anyone skilled in the art reading the specification “would 
understand that it is unimportant how the layers are adhered, so long 
as they are adhered.”361 The court specifically addressed the written 
description requirement,362 and the “scales of the justice” hypothetical 
refers to equivalents to the lead weight—like a pound of feathers—
that are “undisclosed, but obviously art-recognized.”363 Yet it is no 
great stretch to extend the same reasoning to the enablement 
requirement and to the substitution of after-arising materials 
(perhaps a pound of amorphous polymers) that would serve the same 
purpose as the lead weight. In the context of the scales of justice, the 
composition of the weight would still be immaterial to the 
hypothetical applicant’s contribution to the art. 
In re Cook364 concerned zoom lens designs and the discovery that 
controlling the relationship between a small number of design 
parameters served to extend the range of a lens.365 The Patent Office 
rejected the claims as nonenabled because, except for the six specific 
 
 357. See id. at 1213–14. 
 358. Id. at 1215. 
 359. Id. (quoting In re Smythe, 480 F.2d 1376, 1384 (C.C.P.A. 1973)). 
 360. Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting In re Smythe, 480 F.2d 1376, 1384 (C.C.P.A. 
1973)). 
 361. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 362. See id. at 1214–15. 
 363. Id. at 1215 (quoting In re Smythe, 480 F.2d 1376, 1384 (C.C.P.A. 1973)). 
 364. 439 F.2d 730 (C.C.P.A. 1971). 
 365. Id. at 731. 
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designs disclosed in the patent specification, it would have taken a 
skilled practitioner many months to design a zoom lens within the 
scope of the claims.366 The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals 
reversed, noting that designing new zoom lenses had always been a 
demanding task.367 The applicants “d[id] not purport to have solved 
all of the time-consuming problems involved in the design of a new 
lens;” in fact, by “add[ing] new calculations to the design of zoom 
lenses,” they may have added to the designer’s burden.368 What they 
had discovered, and claimed, was a relationship that could be used to 
improve the performance of zoom lenses generally.369 The court 
compared the applicants to a suspension-bridge designer who 
discovered that a specific relationship between the height of the piers 
and the distance between them will increase the strength of the 
bridge: “Disclosure	.	.	.	of this relationship would certainly not solve 
all the time-consuming problems of bridge designing or building, but 
it would, we think, enable any person skilled in the art to practice the 
invention.”370 Although designing a new zoom lens within the scope of 
the claims would have required considerable effort, it was because 
zoom lens design is always difficult, not because the disclosure of the 
applicant’s invention was incomplete. 
If we focus on the inventor’s contribution to the art, we can 
account for some of the “one mode is enough” cases that otherwise 
seem at odds with the usual “full scope of the claim” standard of 
enablement. In Invitrogen Corp. v. Clontech Laboratories, Inc.,371 the 
patent claimed a genetically modified enzyme, reverse transcriptase 
(“RT”), used in the artificial replication of DNA.372 The specification 
disclosed one method of modifying the enzyme (deletion mutation), 
but there was disagreement about the disclosure of others (including 
point mutation).373 Although the claims did not exclude point-
mutated RT and enablement applies to the “full scope of the claimed 
invention[,]”374 the court did not find the disclosures inadequate. Had 
the patentee’s claims been limited to point-modified RT, the 
 
 366. See id. at 732. 
 367. Id. 
 368. Id. 
 369. Id. 
 370. Id. at 732–33. 
 371. 429 F.3d 1052 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 372. Id. at 1058. 
 373. Id. at 1070. 
 374. Id. (quoting Koito Mfg. Co. v. Turn-Key-Tech, LLC, 381 F.3d 1142, 1155 (Fed. 
Cir. 2004)). 
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disclosures might have been nonenabling.375 Instead, they embraced 
any genetically modified RT, and the enablement requirement is 
satisfied by the disclosure of “any mode of making and using the 
invention.”376 The patentee’s disclosures with respect to deletion 
mutation were “sufficient to satisfy [their] part of the patent bargain, 
as [they] fully teach[] a mode of making the claimed invention.”377 
This passage is difficult to understand unless we take it to mean that 
the invention was about the modified RT itself, not about how it was 
made. A single method of making modified RT allowed one to 
practice the “full scope” of the invention because that single method 
produced the material that was the inventor’s contribution to the art. 
Had the claims been to methods of producing modified RT—methods 
broad enough to include point mutation—the outcome might have 
been different.378 
Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc.379 is a similar case. 
The patents concerned laboratory-cultured cells that excrete EPO—a 
hormone that controls the production of red blood cells.380 The 
defendant argued that the specifications failed to enable the full scope 
of the invention because they did not teach how to produce EPO 
using human cells or endogenous human EPO DNA.381 The district 
court concluded that “where the method is immaterial to the claim,” 
the specification need not enable production techniques arising after 
the filing date of the patent.382 Indeed, in the case of a composition 
claim, the specification need enable “only one mode of making and 
using [it].”383 On appeal, the Federal Circuit did not find these 
conclusions erroneous.384 As in Invitrogen, the composition of matter 
 
 375. Id. at 1071 (“[The] validity argument might have force had Invitrogen limited its 
claims to modified RT by reference to point mutation	.	.	.	.”). 
 376. Id. (quoting Johns Hopkins Univ. v. CellPro, Inc., 152 F.3d 1342, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 
1998)). 
 377. Id. (emphasis added). 
 378. See id. (distinguishing National Recovery as a case concerning enablement of “a 
method, not a compound”). 
 379. 314 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 380. Id. at 1319. 
 381. Id. at 1334. 
 382. Id. at 1335 (quoting Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 
69, 160 (D. Mass. 2001)). 
 383. Id. (quoting Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 69, 160 
(D. Mass. 2001)). 
 384. Id. Judge Clevenger, writing in dissent, did protest that the difference between 
composition claims and method claims was one of form rather than substance. Id. at 1359 
(Clevenger, J., dissenting). The majority’s approach, he wrote, leaves “patentees	.	.	.	free to 
decorate their composition claims with source and process limitations without any concern 
for whether the full scope of those limitations is enabled or described.” Id. The 
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constituted the inventor’s contribution to the art; potential methods 
of making it were tangential to that contribution. 
One way to consider whether nonenabled embodiments are 
“tangential” is to ask whether the undue experimentation required to 
practice them involves substituting something different for the 
patentee’s385 contribution to the art or adding something to it. 
Someone who labored over a zoom lens design, but who incorporated 
the formulas disclosed in Cook’s specification, would be adding 
something to the applicant’s contribution. Someone who built a 
mousetrap with the combination of elements recited in a patent claim, 
but who experimented with advanced materials or new features, 
would be doing the same. If a patentee’s contribution can be 
accurately characterized as a new composition of matter, then later-
developed methods of making it are supplements to, not substitutes 
for, the basic idea. On the other hand, because the contexts are so 
different, implementing the invention claimed in Sitrick in motion 
pictures would require technology different from (not in addition to) 
the technology disclosed for video games.386 The same may be true of 
the inventor’s contribution to the art in Automotive Technologies, if 
that contribution is best described as a design for a mechanical air bag 
sensor. Anyone building an electronic sensor would have to devise 
something entirely different. These nonenabled embodiments are not 
tangential; they demonstrate that the patent claims include 
embodiments that do not, in any way, involve the patentee’s 
contribution to the art.387 
 
enablement requirement would be “waived so long as the patentee succeeds in 
characterizing [the] claims as ‘product’ claims.” Id. In this case, he found that the cell 
claimed in the patents was “nothing more than a biological machine for making EPO” and 
that “one who is first to make a machine is not entitled as a matter of law to claim any or 
all machines so long as they perform the same function.” Id. at 1360. The patentees, in his 
view, had invented one type of machine for making EPO but not all of the types included 
within the scope of the claims. 
 385. I use “patentee” in this discussion for the sake of convenience, but the same 
reasoning would apply to patent applicants when enablement challenges arise in the 
course of prosecution. 
 386. See supra notes 161–63 and accompanying text. 
 387. In In re Fisher, the court states that “an inventor should be allowed to dominate 
the future patentable inventions of others where those inventions were based in some way 
on his teachings[;]” even if the new inventions were not obvious, they were “still within his 
contribution, since the improvement was made possible by his work.” In re Fisher, 427 
F.2d 833, 839 (C.C.P.A. 1970). Considering the “contribution” of the first inventor is on 
the right track, but the issue should not be whether the patent’s “teachings	.	.	.	made 
possible” later advancements. Someone can infringe a patent without being aware of it 
and without having the benefit of the patent’s teachings. See Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. 
Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1519 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) (“A patent owner 
may exclude others from practicing the claimed invention, regardless of whether infringers 
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One could also say that these embodiments do not involve the 
patentee’s invention. The problem is that “invention” is used with 
different meanings in patent law. Claim language, supplemented by 
the doctrine of equivalents, defines “the invention” for purposes of 
delimiting the patentee’s exclusive rights.388 But “the invention” can 
also refer to the patentee’s contribution to the useful arts, as taught in 
the patent specification. “The invention,” in that sense, is an idea. The 
claims do not define that idea per se; rather, the claims define a set of 
things in which the inventor’s idea may be reduced to practice.389 
Accordingly, to decide whether a nonenabled embodiment is 
tangential to the patentee’s contribution to the arts, we must look to 
the specification.390 
Identifying the patentee’s contribution to the art, and 
determining whether it is or is not represented in a particular 
nonenabled embodiment, would be easy in some cases (e.g., Sitrick) 
and more difficult in others. ALZA Corp. v. Andrx Pharmaceuticals, 
LLC391 might be one of the difficult cases. There the patentees 
discovered that certain drugs for treating Attention Deficit and 
Hyperactivity Disorder (“ADHD”) are more effective if delivered by 
an extended-release mechanism with an ascending rate of delivery.392 
The specification discussed at length “osmotic dosage forms.”393 
These are pills with semipermeable walls and an opening through 
which the drug is “pushed” by the swelling of a “push layer.”394 The 
specification also mentioned nonosmotic dosage forms that do not 
have a “push layer.”395 The claims were broad enough to cover 
 
even know of the patent	.	.	.	.”), rev’d on other grounds, 520 U.S. 17 (1997). For 
enablement, the question should be whether a nonenabled embodiment within the scope 
of the claims still incorporates the inventor’s contribution to the art, not whether that 
embodiment does or does not rely on information gleaned from the patent disclosure. 
 388. See Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.2d 1336, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en 
banc) (the “principal function” of patent claims “is to provide notice of the boundaries of 
the right to exclude and to define limits”); Alloc, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 342 F.3d 
1361, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“[T]he claims define the scope of an invention.”). 
 389. See supra notes 70–73 and accompanying text. 
 390. This is consistent with other occasions in patent law where one must look beyond 
the claim language to determine what the inventor contributed to the progress of the 
useful arts. See, e.g., MySpace, Inc. v. GraphOn Corp., 672 F.3d 1250, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2012) 
(“An inventor is entitled to claim in a patent what he has invented, but no more.”); 
Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 653 F.3d 1296, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2011) 
(limiting claim language to the examples in the specifications in order to “tether the claims 
to what the specifications indicate the inventor actually invented”). 
 391. 603 F.3d 935 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 392. Id. at 937. 
 393. Id. 
 394. Id. at 937 n.1 
 395. Id. 
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both.396 Applying the Wands factors, the court determined that the 
claims were not enabled because the specification provided 
insufficient guidance to allow the development of nonosmotic dosage 
forms without undue experimentation.397 What the court did not 
consider is whether the inventors’ contribution to the art was a 
specific pill or the general discovery that ascending release rates could 
be used to more effectively treat ADHD. If, as appears to be the case, 
the inventors discovered the latter, then they should be able to claim 
their invention at that level of generality. If other release mechanisms 
were developed later, those would be contributions to the art of a 
different nature—contributions that might be used in conjunction 
with (but not instead of) the patentees’ contribution. The situation 
might have been clearer if the claims at issue had been method claims. 
The validity of a claim to a method of treating ADHD by ascending 
releases of medication should not depend on whether the 
specification taught one how to make every type of pill that might 
provide that ascending release. 
Liebel-Flarsheim is another case that raises doubts. The patent 
describes a configuration that allows a disposable syringe to be 
replaced in an injector mechanism rapidly and using only one hand.398 
This includes an arrangement where a used syringe can be withdrawn 
through an opening in the front of the pressure jacket; in earlier 
designs “[b]ecause the front end of the pressure jacket [was] closed, 
rear loading was necessary, and accessibility	.	.	.	was provided by 
hinging or rotating the jacket to allow for removal and replacement of 
the syringe from the rear.”399 If the inventors’ contribution to the art 
was simply the introduction of a pressure jacket with forward 
accessibility, then the claims could not validly cover injector designs 
with no pressure jacket at all. Those designs would not employ the 
inventors’ contribution to the art. But if the advancement taught in 
the patent was something more general than that—and the 
specification does refer to the need, in earlier designs, to engage in 
time-wasting steps when replacing a syringe that may be unrelated to 
the pressure jacket400—then the presence or absence of a pressure 
jacket may have been as tangential to the inventors’ contribution to 
the art as the use of a particular material for the syringe. In other 
words, if the point of the invention was about something other than 
 
 396. Id. at 937. 
 397. Id. at 940–41. 
 398. See U.S. Patent No. 5,465,669 col. 5 ll. 8–14 (filed Nov. 30, 1993). 
 399. Id. at col. 1 ll. 39–43. 
 400. See id. at col. 2 ll. 2–15. 
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pressure jackets, the patentees could not reasonably be expected to 
exclude from the claims embodiments that do not need pressure 
jackets. Later inventors who find ways to eliminate the pressure 
jacket are making their own, distinct contribution to the art (a 
patentable contribution, if the difficulties were as great as the 
circumstances suggest), but if they are merely adding something to 
the original design, the validity of the basic patent should not be 
called into question. 
This is one place where we need to distinguish between basic 
enablement401 and scope enablement.402 Someone who claims a 
mousetrap should have to disclose one means of making and using 
such a trap, even if that requires the inclusion of details that are 
tangential to the patentee’s contribution to the art. For example, if a 
claimed mousetrap requires a spring with specialized properties, and 
how to make such a spring is unknown to others in the art, the 
patentee should have to teach how to make it—even if that means 
straying into the field of metallurgy rather than mousetrap design per 
se. A specification that did not teach any means to make the patented 
invention would lack the necessary quid pro quo. The burden of such 
a disclosure is relatively manageable, particularly for a patentee who 
has reduced the invention to practice and therefore knows how to 
overcome any technical hurdles that stand in the way of practicing the 
invention. The burden is altogether different (indeed, often 
impossible to meet) if the patentee must disclose in similar depth 
every means of practicing the invention that falls within the scope of 
an open-ended claim. Here it is only reasonable to expect a complete 
disclosure of the patentee’s own contribution to the art. 
C. Other Embodiments That Could Not Reasonably Have Been 
Excluded from the Claim 
In addition to unforeseeable and tangential equivalents, Festo 
includes a third, catchall category of instances where prosecution 
history estoppel should not apply to a patentee who narrowed a 
claim. This comes into play where “some other reason suggest[s] that 
the patentee could not reasonably be expected to have described the 
insubstantial substitute in question.”403 If only for the sake of 
completeness, we should include among the arguments for avoiding 
invalidity “some other reason” that the patent applicant could not 
 
 401. See supra Part I. 
 402. See supra Part II. 
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reasonably be expected to have drafted a claim excluding nonenabled 
embodiments. For example, as the Court notes in Festo, the inherent 
limitations of language may sometimes leave a patent applicant 
without the words needed to delimit precisely the applicant’s 
contribution to the art.404 If the lack of a suitable vocabulary made it 
impossible for the applicant to exclude foreseeable, nontangential, 
and nonenabled embodiments without, at the same time, giving up 
territory to which the applicant could fairly lay claim, that 
circumstance would also justify preserving the validity of the claims.405 
D. A Role for the Reverse Doctrine of Equivalents 
If we recognize the exceptions listed above, there will be some 
occasions where a valid claim will cover embodiments—perhaps a 
significant number of embodiments—that are unrelated to the 
contribution to the art disclosed in the specification. For example, an 
applicant may not have been able to foresee, and therefore exclude, 
species within a claimed genus that are fundamentally different than 
the species taught in the patent. The nonenabled species, rather than 
building on the patentee’s insights, may depend on entirely separate 
technology. The best response in such a case is not to invalidate the 
claim, which is overbroad through no fault of the patentee, but to 
limit its scope. 
One option is to construe claims to cover only the enabled 
embodiments. In Hogan, Judge Miller’s concurring opinion observed 
that claims should be construed in light of the art that was known at 
the time the patent application was filed.406 If, at that time, the term 
“solid polymer” would have been construed as coextensive with the 
solid crystalline species then known, the generic term should not be 
given a broader meaning after the post-filing discovery of solid 
amorphous polymers.407 This construction spares the patentee from 
the impossible burden of enabling a later-discovered species, but it 
leaves those species beyond the reach of the patent. Judge Bryson, 
 
 404. See id. at 731 (“Unfortunately, the nature of language makes it impossible to 
capture the essence of a thing in a patent application.”). 
 405. Such cases may be rare, given the applicant’s freedom to be “his own 
lexicographer.” See Thorner v. Sony Comput. Entm’t Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. 
Cir. 2012). Remarks in Festo also suggest that it may be harder to say what an invention is 
than what it is not. See Festo, 535 U.S. at 738 (“The narrowing amendment may 
demonstrate what the claim is not; but it may still fail to capture precisely what the claim 
is.”). Sometimes all an applicant will need to do to avoid foreseeable problems will be to 
state, in the claim, what the invention does not include. 
 406. In re Hogan, 559 F.2d 595, 610 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (Miller, J., concurring in part). 
 407. Id. 
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concurring in Chiron, advanced a similar argument. Although he 
agreed that enablement must be judged in light of the art known 
when the patent application was filed, he would not interpret Hogan 
“to hold that claims	.	.	.	may be construed broadly enough to 
encompass technology that is not developed until later and [that] was 
not enabled by the original application.”408 “[T]he proper approach,” 
he concluded, “is to address cases of new technology by construing 
claims, where possible, as they would have been understood by one of 
skill in the art at the time of the invention, and not construing them to 
reach as-yet-undeveloped technology that the applicant did not 
enable.”409 This would “preserve[] the benefits of patent protection 
for the invention that the applicant has actually conceived and 
enabled, without extending those benefits for an invention that the 
applicant may not have conceived and certainly has not enabled.”410 
Judge Bryson’s approach is an appealing one as a matter of 
policy, ensuring that inventors obtain patent rights commensurate 
with, but no greater than, their contributions to the art. And it is well 
established that claims should be construed in light of the knowledge 
available to persons skilled in the art when the patent application was 
filed.411 The problem is that sometimes the plain meaning of claim 
language is sufficiently open ended to include technologies that have 
not yet been discovered. If I refer, for example, to a “data storage 
device,” this term includes storage devices that now exist and those 
yet to be devised. If someone invents, next year, an innovative storage 
device based on carbon nanotubes, it would unquestionably be a 
“data storage device” as that term was understood when I used it, 
even if I could not have foreseen the new variety. Construing claim 
language artificially so that it is always limited to the enabled species 
would not only give that language a meaning different than what 
would have been ascribed to it by persons skilled in the art, in effect it 
would allow the specification, rather than the claims, to define the 
limits of the patent grant.412 
 
 408. Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 363 F.3d 1247, 1262 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Bryson, J., 
concurring). Bryson observes that “Hogan explicitly declined to construe the claims at 
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A more promising alternative may be found in the “reverse 
doctrine of equivalents,” a doctrine intended “to prevent 
unwarranted extension of [patent] claims beyond a fair scope of the 
patentee’s invention.”413 In cases where the accused product “is so far 
changed in principle from a patented article that it performs the same 
or a similar function in a substantially different way, but nevertheless 
falls within the literal words of the claim,” the reverse doctrine of 
equivalents “restrict[s] the claim and defeat[s] the patentee’s action 
for infringement.”414 The reverse doctrine could be used to restrict the 
rights of patentees to their contributions to the art, while avoiding 
strained constructions of their claim language. 
One of the few Federal Circuit cases to discuss the reverse 
doctrine in any depth is SRI International v. Matsushita Electric Corp. 
of America.415 There the invention concerned a color television 
camera that generates different signals for the red and blue 
components of a scene through the use of superimposed color-
transparent grids.416 In the preferred embodiment, the grids for red 
and blue were positioned at different angles with respect to the 
scanning beam, so as the beam passed through them it produced 
signals of different frequencies for each color.417 In the accused 
product, because the red and blue grids were positioned at the same 
(but opposite) angles with respect to the scanning beam, they 
produced signals of the same frequency.418 The red and blue signals 
were distinguished, in this case, by timing differences rather than 
frequency differences.419 The accused product literally infringed 
because the red and blue grids were, as the claims required, at 
 
requirement presupposes that a patent applicant defines his invention in the claims, not in 
the specification. After all, the claims, not the specification, provide the measure of the 
patentee’s right to exclude.”). Although the specification is an important tool for 
construing claim language, see Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2005) 
(en banc) (“This court and its predecessors have long emphasized the importance of the 
specification in claim construction.”), one cannot allow the disclosures of the specification 
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Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 336 U.S. 271, 276 (1949) (“It would accomplish little to 
require that claims be separately written if they are not to be separately read.”), aff’d on 
reh’g, 339 U.S. 605 (1950). 
 413. Roche Palo Alto LLC v. Apotex, Inc., 531 F.3d 1372, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2008) 
(quoting Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565, 1581 (Fed. 
Cir. 1991)). 
 414. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608–09 (1950). 
 415. 775 F.2d 1107 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc). 
 416. Id. at 1111–12. 
 417. Id. 
 418. Id. 
 419. See id. at 1136–37 (Kashiwa, J., dissenting). 
94 N.C. L. REV. 1099 (2016) 
2016] PATENT SCOPE & ENABLEMENT 1161 
different angles with respect to each other,420 but Matsushita argued 
that the accused camera, which did not employ that angle to generate 
different frequencies, operated in a substantially different way than 
the patentee’s invention. The court observed that “one may only 
appear to have appropriated the patented contribution” in cases 
where the accused product falls within the literal terms of the patent 
claim.421 If the accused product is, in fact, “so far changed in 
principle” that it operates in a “substantially different way[,]” the 
reverse doctrine of equivalents bars an action for infringement.422 
Here, the majority of the court found that factual disputes made 
summary judgment inappropriate.423 
One can hypothesize that distinguishing color signals of the same 
frequency by timing differences required technological developments 
unforeseeable when the SRI patent application was filed. Perhaps, as 
far as the inventors knew, color grids that were angled with respect to 
each other would necessarily be angled with respect to the scanning 
beam; otherwise how would one distinguish the red signal from the 
blue? However, as it turned out, the specification did not enable 
every color television camera within the scope of the claims. Rather 
than invalidate the claims for a failing that the patentee could not 
have anticipated, it would make sense under those facts to limit the 
scope of the patent, by applying the reverse doctrine of equivalents, 
to cameras that rely on the patentee’s technology. Hogan, the case 
that warns against the misuse of after-arising technology in 
enablement inquiries, suggests just such an approach: although 
“subsequently existing states of the art” have no bearing on validity, 
the reverse doctrine of equivalents, said the court, “may be safely 
relied upon to preclude improper enforcement against later 
developers.”424 
Not everyone would agree that the reverse doctrine of 
equivalents “may be safely relied upon,” if only because it is invoked 
with success so infrequently that it is difficult to take it seriously. In 
Roche Palo Alto LLC v. Apotex, Inc.,425 the Federal Circuit noted that 
the doctrine is “rarely applied” and that the court had never, in its 
history, “affirmed a finding of non-infringement under the reverse 
 
 420. The court noted that a concession of literal infringement “would have saved time 
and cost for all concerned.” Id. at 1118 (majority opinion). 
 421. Id. at 1123. 
 422. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 423. Id. at 1126. 
 424. In re Hogan, 559 F.2d 595, 607 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (emphasis omitted). 
 425. 531 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
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doctrine of equivalents.”426 It is difficult to say why the reverse 
doctrine is largely theoretical, if it is merely the converse of the far 
more frequently applied doctrine of equivalents—“opposite sides of 
the same coin” as the court put it in SRI.427 One problem is that the 
accused product must be literally what the claims describe, yet “so 
changed that it is no longer the same invention.”428 If the claims 
define the scope of “the invention,”429 then this necessary condition 
for applying the reverse doctrine seems an impossibility. The doctrine 
can logically be applied only when courts recognize that, while the 
claims determine the outer limits of the patentee’s rights,430 for some 
purposes “the invention” is better seen as patentee’s contribution to 
the art, as taught in the specification. In Roche Palo Alto, the court 
referred to this as the “principle” of the patent.431 Another reason for 
the rare application of the reverse doctrine is that it may be seen as an 
anachronism432—a principle rendered unnecessary by rules, like 
enablement, requiring the claimed invention to adhere closely to the 
disclosures of the patent.433 If those rules eliminate the possibility of a 
valid claim that encompasses any nonenabled embodiments, then the 
reverse doctrine of equivalents is, indeed, an anachronism. However, 
if the situation is more complicated, as I have suggested in this 
Article, then courts may find the reverse doctrine of equivalents to be 
a valuable and under-used resource—a useful complement to an 
enablement standard that accounts for the real difficulties that patent 
applicants routinely confront. 
 
 426. Id. at 1378. 
 427. SRI, 775 F.2d at 1125. In Graver Tank, the Supreme Court emphasized the 
symmetrical aspect when defending the role of equivalence in patent law: “The 
wholesome realism of [the doctrine of equivalents] is not always applied in favor of a 
patentee but is sometimes used against him.” Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. 
Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950). 
 428. Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2003) 
(quoting Del Mar Avionics, Inc. v. Quinton Instrument Co., 836 F.2d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 
1987)). 
 429. See Comput. Docking Station Corp. v. Dell, Inc., 519 F.3d 1366, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 
2008) (“The words of the claims define the scope of the patented invention.”). 
 430. See Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en 
banc) (the “principal function” of the claims “is to provide notice of the boundaries of the 
right to exclude and to define limits”). 
 431. Roche Palo Alto, 531 F.3d at 1378 (the defendant failed to establish a prima facie 
case of noninfringement under the reverse doctrine because it had not identified the 
“principle of the	.	.	.	patent,” as it would be “determined in light of the specification, 
prosecution history, and the prior art”). 
 432. Tate Access Floors, Inc. v. Interface Architectural Res., Inc., 279 F.3d 1357, 1368 
(Fed. Cir. 2002) (referring to the reverse doctrine of equivalents as an “anachronistic 
exception, long mentioned but rarely applied”). 
 433. Id. 
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CONCLUSION 
Like other branches of intellectual property, patent law is 
animated (or afflicted) by policy concerns “that tug in opposite 
directions.”434 Lately, courts have been much occupied with the 
dangers of patent claims so broadly worded that they threaten to 
stand in the way of technological progress.435 Yet, if we still trust in 
the constitutional premise that exclusive rights, as a rule, serve to 
“promote the Progress of	.	.	.	[the] useful Arts[,]” we must equally 
guard against rules limiting patent claims so severely that 
fundamental advancements receive inadequate reward.436 This tension 
lies at the heart of the enablement requirement as it is applied in the 
context of rapidly developing arts. Patentees should be expected to 
provide the traditional quid pro quo of teachings commensurate with 
their rights. At the same time, we must recognize that the most 
significant advancements are those capable of being exploited in a 
multitude of ways, some of them unanticipated by the original 
discoverer. The inventions that are the most fundamental, and the 
most susceptible to elaboration, should not for that very reason be 
denied meaningful protection. 
Courts grappling with these concerns have left us with a 
collection of principles, observations, and results that are difficult to 
reconcile. The contradictions will be eased, and a better foundation 
established for promoting the progress of the useful arts, if we adopt 
the perspective of a reasonable patent applicant in cases where the 
claims are broader in scope than the enabling disclosures. If the 
overbreadth is attributable to the unforeseeability of new 
embodiments that arise in rapidly advancing arts, the claims should 
not be invalidated—though they may be limited in scope by 
application of the reverse doctrine of equivalents. If the nonenabled 
embodiments are “tangential”—if, in other words, they are 
nonenabled only because of aspects unrelated to the patentee’s 
contribution to the art—then they should not affect the validity or 
 
 434. Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2129 (2014) (“To 
determine the proper office of the definiteness command	.	.	.	we must reconcile concerns 
that tug in opposite directions.”). 
 435. See, e.g., Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 
2116 (2013) (referring to the danger that patents encompassing basic tools will “inhibit 
future innovation premised upon them”—a result “at odds with the very point of patents, 
which exist to promote creation” (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus 
Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1301 (2012))). 
 436. See Lab Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 127 (2006) 
(Breyer, J., dissenting from dismissal of the writ of certiorari) (referring to the “opposing 
and risky shoals” of overprotection and underprotection). 
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scope of the patent. They are simply the product of the open-ended 
nature of patent claims. Although this approach is not mandated by 
Festo, it is consistent with the spirit of that case in recognizing both 
the larger demands of policy and the practical difficulties that face 
even the best intentioned and most deserving patent applicants. 
